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RIGHT OF POLICY HOLDER TO CLAIM PROCEEDS OF REINSURANCE
THE Security Union Insurance Company issued a $10,000 fire insurance policy to
the plaintiff, ceding that part of the risk in excess of $2,500 to the Inter-Ocean Com-
pany in accordance with a contract of reinsurance then in operation between the two
companies. It does not appear the plaintiff knew of this contract or of the fact of
cession of the excess risk at the time. For a loss under the policy plaintiff recov-
ered a judgment against the Security Union for $10,366.48; but on the same day
and before the judgment was paid, a receiver was appointed to liquidate the insurer.
Both the receiver and the assured claimed the sum owed by the Inter-Ocean Com-
pany, which paid an agreed sum into court for release of its liability. An award of
the fund to the plaintiff as a credit on its judgment was reversed by the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals, and the money awarded to the receiver as a general asset
of the insolvent company.'
Reinsurance is a widely used and generally accepted method whereby an insur-
ance company can shift to another company a portion of each of the large risks
which it assumes-in order to effect a distribution of potential loss.2  An insurer
can not achieve financial stability if it assumes comparatively few large risks along
with many small ones;3 yet business requirements do not produce uniformity of
need on the part of the customers. The undesirable alternatives of refusing prof-
fered business or incurring unwise liabilities present themselves. But resort to re-
insurance obviates this difficulty, 4 enabling the insurer to determine the maximum
single risk he can safely assume, accept all proffered business without regard to the
amount involved, and cede the excess risk of large policies to other companies.0
The insurer is entitled to payment from the reinsurer when a loss occurs under
the original policy,6 exactly as if there were an original contract of insurance be-
1. Morrow v. Burlington Basket Co., 66 S. W. (2d) 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
2. As here used reinsurance refers only to the type of contract described. A different
case is presented when the "reinsurer" is taking over the insurer's business, promising to
make payments directly to the assured, and perhaps entering into contractual relations with
the assured by novation. Whitney v. American Insurance Co., 6 Cal. Unrep. 220, 56 Pac.
50 (1899), aff'd, 127 Cal. 464, 59 Pac. 897 (1900); People v. National Surety Co., 68
Colo. 231, 188 Pac. 653 (1920); Well v. Federal Life Insurance Co., 264 Ill. 425, 106
N. E. 246 (1914); Barnes v. Hekla Fire Insurance Co., 56 Minn. 38, 57 N. W. 314 (1893);
Glen v. Hope Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 56 N. Y. 379 (1874); Shoaf v.
Palatine Insurance Co., 127 N. C. 308, 37 S. E. 451 (1900); Ruohs v. Insurance Co., 111
Tenn. 405, 78 S. W. 85 (1903); Johannes v. The Phoenix Insurance Co., 66 Wis. 50, 27
N. W. 414 (1886); VANCE, INsURANCE: (2d ed. 1930) 944, 950.
3. See Scheide, Reinsuranme, in 2 DUNm , THE BusnEss oF INsURAncE (1912) 452;
VANCE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 943.
4. RIEGEL AND Lo AN, INsuRANcE PincipLEs AND PRATc c~s (rev. ed. 1929) 73.
5. This is known as "obligatory" reinsurance, as opposed to "facultative" reinsurance,
whereby risks are ceded separately after they have been assumed.
6. Allemannia Insurance Co. v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 209 U. S. 326 (1908); In re
Republic Insurance Co., Fed. Cas. No. 11,705 (N. D. Ill. 1873); Eagle Insurance Co. v.
Lafayette Insurance Co., 9 Ind. 443 (1857) ; Hone v. Mutual Safety Insurance Co., 1 Sandf.
tween the companies. 7 The assured rarely knows that his risk is thus reinsured, for
experience has shown that knowledge of this practice has a depressive effect on
the insurer's credit position.8 So a series of secret contract relationships, appropri-
ately termed "treaties" and "pools," has developed to perform this necessary
function. 9 Because of the size and number of claims handled, and the inter-rela-
tionships which result, a highly complex administrative system has become a fre-
quent concomitant of the practice.' 0
When, as in the instant case, an insurance company has become insolvent, it
may be argued that the money owed to it on the contract of reinsurance should be
segregated and paid to the holders of policies whose risks have been reinsured. To
sustain such a claim it may be said that in effect the insurer assumed only part of
the plaintiff's risk and acted as an agent to insure the remainder with another com-
pany; premiums paid by the plaintiff to the insurer were passed on in part as pre-
miums for the reinsurance and became the consideration for the fund now sought
by plaintiff. Or, it might be maintained that the reinsurance is such a provision
made by the insurer for payment of the debt to the plaintiff that he may resort to
equity to follow the provision for his benefit.11 To the objection that allowance of
the claim would result in a preference to the plaintiff over small policy holders' 2 who
would otherwise share in the reinsurance payment as a general asset, it may be
answered that the excess risk of the plaintiff has not endangered their security, while
they have benefited through the wider distribution of risk effected through the ad-
ditional business which would have been unavailable but for the reinsurance.
But these arguments overlook the fact that the contract of reinsurance is actually
made for the benefit of the insurance companies and ultimately of its creditors;13
consequently its payment to the assured might more logically be limited to con-
137 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1847), aff'd, 2 N. Y. 235 (1849); In re Goodrich and Hick's Appeal,
109 Pa. 523, 2 Atl. 209 (1885); In re Law Guarantee Trust and Accident Society, Ltd.
Liverpool Mortgage Insurance Company's Case (1914] 2 Ch. 617; 1 JoYcE, I1sURA c-
(2d ed. 1917) § 134.
7. Cases cited supra note 6; 1 JoYcz, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 135; VANCE, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 942.
8. RrEGEL AND Lom", op. cit. supra note 4, at 74; Scheide, supra note 3 at 454.
9. RicmrDAis, LAW Or INsuRANcE (4th ed. 1932) § 488; REGEL AND LoMAN, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 76 et seq.; Scheide, supra note 3, at 567 et seq.
10. See note 9, supra.
11. One case has allowed recovery on this theory. Hunt v. New Hampshire Fire Under-
writers' Association, 68 N. H. 305, 38 Atl. 145 (1895) (insolvent company was reinsurer,
and original insurer was allowed to maintain suit against one who had reinsured the
reinsurer). But cf. David Bradley & Co. v. Brown, 78 Neb. 836, 112 N. W. 331 (1907)
(agent assumed by contract the risk of loss of his principal's goods temporarily in his
possession and procured insurance on them. After a loss, agent was adjudged bankrupt.
Held, principal is not entitled to the insurance money).
12. As to the undesirability of such a result, see Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 794.
13. Vial v. Norwich Fire Insurance Society, 257 Ill. 355, 100 N. E. 929 (1913);
Herckenrath v. The American Mutual Insurance Co., 3 Barb. Ch. 63 (N. Y. 1848); see
Consolidated Real Estate & Fire Insurance Co. v. Cashow, 41 Md. 59, 74 (1874) ; Strong v.
Phoenix Insurance Co., 62 Mo. 289, 297 (1876); Gantt v. The American Central Insurance
Co., 68 Mo. 503, 533 (1878); ItA re Law Guarantee Trust and Accident Society, Ltd.
Liverpool Mortgage Insurance Company's case, supra note 6, at 647; 1 JoYcE, op. cit. supra




ditions when it would accomplish this purpose. In the instant case sustention of
the claim would have precisely the opposite effect. Also, the benefit enjoyed by the
small policy holders through additional distribution of risk is balanced by the fact
that they stand to lose in the event of the reinsurer's insolvency. Furthermore, it
must be remembered that the reinsurance contract may run both ways,' 4 so that
upon the insolvency of the insurer, benefits from the reinsurance contract may be
lessened considerably by set-offs of risks that it has likewise assumed for its re-
insurer.1' That this was apparently not true in the present case does not destroy
the probability. With the possible exception, then, of the unusual case where an
assured could show that he had known that part of his risk was to be reinsured, and
that he had relied upon that fact with the express or implied understanding that
the provision was actually for his benefit,16 there would appear to be no reason to
permit his claim. In the absence of such unusual circumstances, the complexity of
the reinsurance arrangements and the administrative difficulties that would arise
from allowing such priorities suggest a policy of non-interference.
APPLICATION OF SHIP MORTGAGE LOANS TO NONMARITIME PURPOSES AS DEFEATING
ADmIRALTY JURISDICTION
UNDER the Ship Mortgage Act of 19201 a mortgage on an American vessel of 200 or
more gross tons, when properly recorded with port officials and endorsed upon the
ship's papers, attains a preferred status, giving rise to a maritime lien and conse-
quently taking priority over all nonmaritime claims. Such a mortgage is foreclosed
by means of an ordinary suit in rem in admiralty, with exclusive original jurisdiction
in the federal district courts.2 Prior to 1920 there were two principal methods of
raising funds on the credit of a vessel, by mortgage and by bottomry bond. The ship
mortgage of that period had no standing in admiralty; it neither created a maritime
14. This is usual where "pools" are employed. See note 9, supra.
15. See WATEnarm, SET-OFF, RECOUPIE NT .An COUNTErRCLA. (2d ed. 1872) 450 et seq.;
Campbell, Right to Set Off Claims against the Estate in an Action Brought by a Receiver
(1914) 79 CENT. L. J. 237; Clarke, Set-Off in Cases of Immature Claims in Insolvency and
Receivership (1920) 34 HA~v. L. Rrv. 178.
16. Where bargaining and reliance were shown, recovery was properly allowed. Globe
National Fire Insurance Co. v. American Bonding & Casualty Co., 198 Iowa 1072, 195
N. W. 728 (1923), 200 N. W. 737 (1924), 200 Iowa 847, 205 N. W. 504 (1925), 215 N. W.
631 (1927), 205 Iowa 1085, 217 N. W. 268 (1928). But cf. Greenman v. General Rein-
surance Corporation, 237 App. Div. 648, 262 N. Y. Supp. 569 (2d Dep't 1933) (Injured
has no right of action against reinsurer though insured purchased liability policy in reliance
on reinsurance. And it was said obiter that reliance did not show intent to give privity
even to insured).
1. 41 STAT. 1000-1006 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §§ 911-984 (1926). See Canfield, The Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920 (1923) 22 MIcir. L. REv. 10.
2. 41 STAT. 1003 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 951 (1926). Contrary to the customary order
of precedence among maritime liens, ship mortgages are given priority only over subsequent
liens, and the generally favored claims for wages, general average, salvage and damages arising
out of tort have priority irrespective of the dates of their accrual. 41 STAT. 1004 (1920),
46 U. S. C. § 953 (1926). Consequently there are few maritime lienors in danger of having
their security in a vessel defeated by the claim of a mortgagee except materialmen and
repairmen whose liens arise after the execution of the mortgage, and they are protected by
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lien nor could it be enforced by an admiralty suit in personam. 3 The mortgagee in
proceeding against his security was consequently relegated to a status inferior to
that of all maritime lienors, regardless of the fact that their claims might have
accrued subsequent to the date of the mortgage.4 In order to attract more capital
into the field of maritime investment, or as stated in the Act of 1920, "to develop and
encourage the maintenance" of the American merchant marine, 5 the preferred mort-
gage was made to combine the advantages of bottomry bonds and of the earlier
mortgages by giving the mortgagee the power not only to proceed in rem against the
vessel but also, on default of the mortgage, to bring a personal proceeding in ad-
miralty against the borrower for the amount of the outstanding mortgage
indebtedness.0
In a recent case mortgages were executed on the steamers Thomas Barlum and
John J. Barlum to secure two loans of $200,000 each. The mortgages were properly
recorded and endorsed as required by statute for the creation of a preferred status.
It was understood by the parties that of the amount advanced less than $50,000 was
to be expended directly upon the vessels, the remainder being intended to cover
various indebtedness of the mortgagors and of certain other individuals; at least
$190,000 was to be used for distinctly nonmaritime purposes. The mortgages having
been defaulted, foreclosure proceedings were instituted in admiralty, and the order
of sale entered in the district court7 was thereafter rqversed by the circuit court of
appeals on the ground that admiralty was without power to assume jurisdiction over
the libel.8 The reasons advanced by the court were that the mortgages in suit, being
contracts essentially nonmaritime in nature, were therefore not cognizable in admiralty,
and that the Ship Mortgage Act, if it should be interpreted to confer jurisdiction of
admiralty over mortgages for nonmaritime purposes, would be unconstitutional.
There was no dispute that the formalities incident to the creation of preferred mort-
gages were fully complied with. The only objection to their validity as such arose
out of the fact that a considerable part of the proceeds was advanced for private
purposes and not to promote the welfare of the American merchant marine.
The former denial of admiralty jurisdiction over mortgages on ships appears to
have come about as a result of the early unwillingness of the English courts of com-
mon law to relinquish to the domain of admiralty the power of determining proprie-
the recordation of the mortgage on the ship's papers, which they are empowered by statute
to inspect. 41 STAT. 1001 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 923 (1926).
3. The John Jay, 17 How. 399 (U. S. 1854); The Eclipse, 135 U. S. 599 (1890); The
J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1 (1893).
4. Bottomry bonds, creating a maritime lien on the ship and perhaps on her cargo,
depending upon the terms, differed essentially from the early ship mortgages in that the
lender risked his loan entirely upon the success of the voyage. If the ship were lost before
its arrival at the port of destination, the obligation was entirely discharged, the lender
being under no personal duty to repay the loan. The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129, 135 (U. S.
1869).
5. 41 STAT. 988 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 861 (1926). The Ship Mortgage Act constitutes
a part of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), 41 STAT. 988-1008 (1920), 46
U. S. C. §§ 861-984 (1926).
6. 41 STAT. 1004 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 954 (1926).
7. The Thomas Barium, 2 F. Supp. 733 (W. D. N. Y. 1933). See also Detroit Trust Co.
v. Barium S. S. Co., 56 F. (2d) 455 (W. D. N. Y. 1932), overruling the libelee's exceptions
based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the Ship Mortgage Act.
8. The Thomas Barum, 68 F. (2d) 946 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). Cert. granted, Detroit
Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 54 Sup. Ct. 717 (1934).
tary interests in ships ;9 but there was never any contention that mortgages on vessels,
regardless of the purposes for which they were made, were entirely divorced from
maritime affairs. In fact, Parliament in 1840 recognized the advantage to be gained
from placing ship mortgages within the maritime field and extended to the Court of
Admiralty full jurisdiction to decide all questions with reference to the ownership
of vessels, including the foreclosure of mortgages.' 0 American admiralty courts, lack-
ing statutory authorization, steadfastly refused to take cognizance of any controversy
involving property interests in ships" and even now deny their jurisdiction over
contracts for the sale of a vessel.'
2
Whether the present transactions ought to be regarded as maritime contracts and
therefore cognizable in admiralty, apart from the fact that ship mortgages are made
so by the Act of 1920, should seemingly be a matter of convenience. The money
advanced on security of the vessels may have been employed in the main for non-
maritime purposes, yet the agreements contemplated the transfer of property inter-
ests in ships, subject in all other respects to the jurisdiction of admiralty. Although
before 1920 the federal courts denied their maritime power to adjudicate ship mort-
gages, however the proceeds of the loan may have been distributed, in so doing they
at least achieved uniformity. If they are now willing to recognize such mortgages,
as their conduct has thus far indicated,' 3 and if uniformity is, as has frequently been
suggested, one of the essential characteristics of maritime law,14 the maintenance
of that uniformity should require that all ship mortgages be classified alike, regard-
less of the disposition of the funds they secure.
In its refusal to assume jurisdiction over the mortgages in suit the present decision
necessarily involves a serious challenge to the constitutionality of the Ship Mortgage
Act as it now stands.15 Nowhere in the Act is there any restriction as to how a loan
secured by a ship mortgage may be used. There are certain formal prerequisites to
the creation of a valid preferred mortgage,1 6 and when these are complied with, a
maritime lien in favor of the mortgagee results automatically. This decision indi-
cates that it is beyond the power of Congress to enact such legislation, unless the Act
be interpreted to create the status of a preferred mortgage only if the loan secured
9. The Neptune, 3 Hag. Ad. 129 (1834); The John Jay, supra note 3, at 402.
10. 3 & 4 Vicr. c. 65, §§ 3, 4 (1840).
11. In 1854 the Supreme Court, noting the extension of English admiralty to ship mort-
gages, said: "Until that shall be done in the United States, by congress, the rule in this
particular must continue in the admiralty courts of the United States, as it has been." The
John Jay, supra note 3, at 403.
12. The Ada, 250 Fed. 194 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
13. Thus far substantially the only reason for denying the preferred status of a ship
mortgage has been the lack of proper recordation and endorsement, as required by statute.
See, for example, The Bethlehem, 4 F. (2d) 308 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1925); The Bergen, 7 F.
(2d) 379 (S. D. Cal. 1925); National Bank of Fayette County v. Enterprise Marine Dock
Co., 43 F. (2d) 547 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
14. ". . . no such legislation is valid if it ...interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations . . . The necessary con-
sequence would be destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which
the Constitution was designed to establish." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S.
205, 216, 217 (1917).
15. The Ship Mortgage Act has previously been held constitutional without limitation
in The Oconee, 280 Fed. 927 (E. D. Va. 1922), and The Lincoln Land, 295 Fed. 358 (D.
Mass. 1924).
16. 41 STAT 1000, 1001 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 922 (1926).
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thereby is directly applied to maritime purposes, seemingly an unwarranted conclusion
since no reference to such an intention can be found in the Act's provisions.
In passing upon the validity of legislation enacted subsequent to the Jensen case
7
the Supreme Court decided that Congress had no power to extend the jurisdiction
of state compensation tribunals to cover injuries suffered by longshoremen in the
course of their maritime employment.' 8 The present case threatens to go even far-
ther by denying to Congress the power to extend the admiralty jurisdiction to any
ship mortgage unless its purpose is the direct benefit of American shipping. The
possibility of indirect benefit to shipping appears to be ignored. It may be that
the mortgagor could have obtained no loan whatsoever had he not been willing to
apply part of the proceeds to the extinguishment of an earlier debt owed to the
mortgagee. Perhaps without the assistance of such a loan, though the amount
be used for nonmaritime purposes, the mortgagor would be obliged to discontinue
operations and let his vessels remain idle. In any event, the decision seriously
threatens to destroy the maritime status of many ship mortgages now in existence,
in spite of ie fact that it limits itself to situations wherein "the mortgagor and mort-
gagee both knew in advance . . . that the moneys advanced . . . were intended for
and actually were used for nonmaritime purposes."'19 Though it is inferred in the
court's opinion that if the greater part of a mortgage loan were applied to the benefit
of ships the mortgage would therefore constitute a maritime contract cognizable in
admiralty, the difficulty of determining in many instances whether or not the greater
amount was intended directly for the purposes of shipping would be exceedingly con-
ducive to litigation instituted both by the mortgagor and by other maritime lienors
attempting to assert the priority of their claims over the mortgage. Any benefits
to American shipping that can result from the present decision are difficult to dis-
cover; its more probable effects are confusion and added litigation with respect to
ship mortgages.
LEGISLATiVE REDUCTION OF JUDICIAL COMPENSATION DURING THE DEPRESSION
PURSUANT to an economy program of the Governor of Oklahoma, the legislature of
that state approved an inadequate appropriation for judicial salaries in spite of a
constitutional provision prohibiting reduction of the salaries of public officers during
a term of office. Those members of the Supreme Court whose salaries were affected
by reason of this legislative act disqualified themselves while the Governor was out
of the state and secured from a special tribunal, appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor,
a writ of mandamus ordering full payment of their statutory salaries. Subsequently,
lower court judges sought from the Supreme Court similar writs against the state
treasurer. Meanwhile the Governor had returned to the state, and in order to safe-
guard his fiscal program, intervened to request the disqualification of the Supreme
17. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 14.
18. The constitutional grant of authority to the federal government in "all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction," Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 1, and the provision in the Ju-
didary Act of 1789 giving the district courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," 1 STAT. 77 (1789), 28 U. S. C. §§ 41 (3), 371
(1926), were held to place legislation of that nature outside the limits of congressional
action. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920); State of Washington v.
W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924).
19. The Thomas Barium, supra note 8, at 948.
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Court justices so that he could appoint another special tribunal to dispose of the case.
The Supreme Court, however, held that since its own claim had been previously
settled, it had no immediate interest in the present suit which would disqualify it,
and proceeded to grant the requested writs."
In conjunction with other financial tasks, it is generally within the power of a
legislature to determine the compensation of even those judges whose offices are cre-
ated by a constitution. Consequently, to preserve judicial independence from
legislative coercion that might be exerted by an actual or threatened change of salary,
the Federal Constitution2 and generally the state constitutions
3 prohibit a diminution
of judicial compensation during tenure of office. Many of these constitutional safe-
guards also seek to prevent a further source of influence by prohibiting increases of
compensation as well.4 Thus the judges are to a large extent protected from pre-
judicial influences due to financial considerations and are able to exercise an inde-
pendent judgment even in matters of political significance. It is interesting to note
that these dual provisions have not been viewed in the same light when presented to a
court for interpretation. Thus where judicial districts are decreased in 'size, no com-
mensurate reduction is allowed in the salaries of the district judges who were in office
prior to the redistricting.6 The imposition of a general income tax is considered an
unconstitutional reduction 7 even where the salary was fixed and the judge appointed
after the passage of the income tax law.8 On the other hand, increases are directly
allowed in some states on the ground that a judge is not a public officer within the
meaning of a general prohibition against altering salaries of such officers; 9 and else-
1. Riley v. Carter, 25 P. (2d) 666 (Okla. 1933), protected the salaries of the Supreme
Court judges; Edwards v. Carter, 29 P. (2d) 609 (Okla. 1933), allowed the Governor to
intervene, but Edwards v. Carter, 29 P. (2d) 605 (Okla. 1933), disallowed his claim that
the Supreme Court was disqualified; Edwards v. Carter 29 P. (2d) 610 (Okla. 1933), pro-
tected the salaries of lower court judges; and State v. Weems, 29 P. (2d) 942 (Okla. 1934),
prevented further action by the Governor.
2. U. S. CONST. Art. 3, § 1.
3. Mmi. CoNsT. Art. 6, § 6; N. Y. CONST. Art. 6, § 19.
4. ILL. CONST. Art. 6, § 7; Mo. CoNsT. Art. 6, § 33; cf. Coze. CoNsT. Art. 24.
5. Legislative control through salary reductions is generally successful only with judges
of courts created for legislative purposes, and therefore outside the constitutional protec-
tion. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933) (Supreme Court of District of
Columbia is constitutional court, so judges are immune from salary reduction) ; Note (1933)
47 H v. L. REv. 133; Comment (1933) 43 Y=L L. J. 316; see In re Summers, 149 Misc.
27, 266 N. Y. Supp. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1933); cf. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553
(1933) (salaries of judges of Court of Claims not immune); Gresser v. O'Brien, 146 Misc.
909, 263 N. Y. Supp. 68 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
6. Bailey v. Waters, 308 Pa. 309, 162 Atl. 819 (1932); cf Zangerle v. State, 115 Ohio
168, 152 N. E. 658 (1926) ; Foster v. Jones, 79 Va. 642 (1884).
7. Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920) ; Long v. Vatts, 183 N. C. 99, 110 S. E. 765
(1922); Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 V. & S. 403 (Pa. 1843). Contra: Taylor v. Gehner,
329 Mo. 511, 45 S. W. (2d) 59 (1932); State v. Nygaard, 159 Wis. 396, 150 N. V. 513
(1915); Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 915.
8. Miles v. Graham, 268 U. S. 501 (1925); see Lowndes, Taxing Income of the Federal
Judiciary (1932) 19 VA. L. REv. 153.
9. Commonwealth v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 59 AtI. 961 (1904). Contra: Greenlee
County v. Laine, 20 Ariz. 296, 180 Pac. 151 (1919). But the fear of dependence has pre-
served from change the salary of a judge not specifically mentioned by the judicial pro-
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where a similar prohibition has been held to apply only to gratuities rather than to
additional compensation."0 Moreover, increases are indirectly obtained by allowing
extra compensation where additional duties are imposed upon a judge." Refusal to
permit some of the devices by which indirect decreases have been attempted, such as
changing the size of a judicial district, may readily be justified inasmuch as such a
device, once established in law, could easily be used to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition. But so could the various devices by which indirect increases have been
secured. For example, there is no assurance that salary will be increased only in
proportion to duties added. Accordingly, the action of the courts in allowing such
increases is of doubtful impartiality. Furthermore, it is dificult to see why a general
income tax is such a diminution as to be invalid, for the prohibition against decreases
implies a fear only of taxes levied solely upon the judiciary.12
In the instant case it would seem that the Oklahoma court has similarly dis-
regarded the purpose of the constitutional provision, thereby unnecessarily restricting
legislative freedom to deal with an important problem of economy. It could not
of course be expected that the legislature would be allowed to evade the purpose of
the prohibition by the artifice of failing to appropriate sufficient funds to pay the
constitutionally protected salaries.13 But it does not appear that such was the inten-
tion of the legislature. The salaries in question were fixed during the presumptively
more prosperous times of 1929. In the present period of financial stringency it could
appear that an insufficient appropriation is not necessarily a reduction of salary con-
trary to the spirit of the constitution, but is rather a temporary measure to reduce
governmental expenses and equitably to apportion a reduced income among the state's
employees during a period of emergency.14 Certainly to adopt this view would not
defeat the purpose of the prohibition by making the judiciary subservient to the
legislative will, for the courts may reserve to themselves the power to determine when
the period of emergency is ended and the legislative action, if continued, no longer
visions in the constitution by applying to them the provision forbidding increase or diminu-
tion of a "public officer's" salary. Willett v. Weaver, 205 Ala. 268, 87 So. 601 (1921);
Dunham v. Tilma, 191 Mich. 688, 158 N. W. 216 (1916). But cf. McCracken County v.
Reed, 125 Ky. 420, 101 S. W. 348 (1907); State v. Kalb, 50 Wis. 178, 6 N. W. 557 (1880).
10. McGovern v. Mitchell, 78 Conn. 536, 63 Ati. 433 (1906).
11. Duties not within the regular jurisdiction of the particular court. James v. Cam-
mach, 139 Ky. 223, 129 S. W. 582 (1910); State v. Kositzky, 38 N. D. 616, 166 N. W.
534 (1918); People v. Finch, 11 Misc. 257, 32 N. Y. Supp. 218 (Super. Ct. 1895), aff'd,
145 N. Y. 261, 39 N. E. 972 (1895). Contra: Hall v. Hamilton, 74 Ill. 437 (1874); ef.
Foreman v. People, 209 Ill. 567, 71 N E.. 35 (1904).
12. Even though the refusal to tolerate a general tax on income may not be justified
under the purpose of the prohibition, such a lack of justification does not imply that a con-
trary result is desirable. The refusal may be wholly acceptable to those who believe that
judges deserve a certain amount of special treatment.
13. There is generally held to be, in such a case, no need for an express appropriation
by the legislature. Thomas v. Owens, 4 Md. 189 (1853); Wade v. Kenney, 10 Mont. 485,
26 Pac. 197 (1891); State v. Clausen, 98 Wash. 253, 167 Pac. §47 (1917); cf. Proctor v.
Hunt, 29 P. (2d) 1058 (Ariz. 1934).
14. Although it is true that constitutional rights are not suspended during an emergency
[see Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866)] yet conditions change the interpretation of
those rights. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921) ; Lajoie v. Milliken, 242 Mass. 508,
136 N. E. 419 (1922); Wickersham, The Police Power and the New York Emergency Rent
Laws (1921) 69 U. of PA. L. REV. 301.
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warranted. 15 No reason appears why judges should not share with others the neces-
sary deprivations of a financial depression. And if that possibility had been accorded
explicit attention by the court, investigation would thus have been drawn to the actual
issue of whether this action on the part of the legislature is within the scope of the
constitutional prohibition, rather than to the dialectic by which the conclusion is
justified.
PRIORITY AMONG JUDGMENT CREDITORS IN PROPERTY FRAUDULENTLY CONVEYED
THE procedural difficulties presented in disposing of property among competing judg-
ment creditors are suggested by a recent New Jersey case., A debtor conveyed land
to a third person in fraud of creditors. Subsequently a creditor bank secured a judg-
ment against the debtor and levied execution on the land. Thereafter, a second cred-
itor obtained a judgment and levied execution; he then obtained a decree in equity
setting the conveyance aside as fraudulent before the first judgment creditor had
taken action to do so. Afterward, the first judgment creditor, the bank, also obtained
a decree setting the conveyance aside and subsequently purchased the land under its
own execution at law. The parties sought a decree to quiet title. Pointing out that
in New Jersey the priority of judgment liens at law is determined by the chrono-
logical order of the levy of executions on such judgments, the court held that the
bank's prior levy of execution gave it title as against the second judgment creditor,
despite the latter's prior decree setting aside the conveyance. The court also indi-
cated that conveyances in fraud of creditors are void as to them, not merely voidable,
and that creditors may proceed at law against the property which has been conveyed
without first applying to equity to have the deed set aside.
Creditors have a choice of several procedures in seeking satisfaction out of land
fraudulently conveyed by a debtor.2 They may complete their remedies at law first,
by obtaining a judgment and following with levy of execution and sale of the prop-
erty, placing the burden of quieting title on the ultimate purchaser.3 Or, after
obtaining a judgment at law in order to establish their claim, but before levy of exe-
cution, they may apply to a court of equity to have the conveyance set aside as
fraudulent with respect to them.4 In states where the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act is in force, however, a judgment at law would probably not be necessar,
15. Mandamus can be denied within the discretion of the court. Hourigan v. North
Bergen Township, 165 Atl. 74 (N. J. 1933) (denial of mandamus where compulsion to levy
tax would confuse financial status); cf. Note (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 99. Subsequently in a
proper case it can be granted when the court declares that the emergency is over. See
Chastleton v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543 (1924).
1. Swift & Co. v. First National Bank of Hightstown, 114 N. J. Eq. 417, 168 Aft. 827
(1933).
2. Jackson v. Holbrook, 36 Minn. 494, 498, 32 N. W. 852, 853 (1887); Littick v. Meanw,
195 S. W. 729, 730 (Mo. 1917); GLENNT, LAw op FRAUDULENT CONvEYANcEs (1931) 160.
See UNIFORi FRAurDULriLT CoNvEYANCE AcT, § 9.
3. In re Lowe, 19 Fed. 589, 590 (D. Ind., 1884); Stelle v. Dennis, 104 Fla. 384, 386,
140 So. 194, 195 (1932); Michaud v. Michaud, 129 Me. 282, 285, 151 Atl. 559, 560 (1930);
Doland v. Burns Lumber Co., 156 Minn. 238, 240, 194 N. W. 636, 637 (1923).
4. Stelle v. Dennis supra note 3; Tom 0. Mason Co. v. Lindquist, 200 Wis. 11, 14,
227 N. W. 392, 394 (1929).
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before equitable relief could be secured.5 In some states the creditors may attach
the property before obtaining a judgment at law or an equitable decree declaring the
conveyance fraudulent, and then follow with suit at law or equity, completing the
action by execution and sale.6
If there is a deficiency of assets of a debtor, the creditor who seems most diligent
in seeking satisfaction is accorded preference.7 Hence, as between those who have
proceeded no farther than to obtain a judgment or an attachment, the first judgment
or attachment recorded is held to create a prior lien on the realty of the debtor.
8
Though a New Jersey statute is so worded that the judgment lien of a junior judg-
ment creditor is given priority if he acts quickly and levies execution on realty before
a senior judgment creditor does so, 9 the general rule in other states is that such
greater diligence in levying execution on the judgments will not alter the priority of
judgment liens of unequal status.' 0 However, judgments rendered at the same time,
or, in some states, at the same term, have equal liens, and the first holder of such
a judgment to levy execution thereon is given priority because he is said to have
shown the greater diligence.11 When property has been acquired by the debtor after
the entry of the judgments, some courts have held that all the liens attach simul-
5. American Surety Co v. Conner, 251 N. Y. 1, 166 N. E. 783 (1929); Conemaugh Iron
Works Co. v. Delano Coal Co., 298 Pa. 182, 148 AtU. 94 (1929); Glenn, The Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act; Rights of Creditor Without Judgment, (1930) 30 CoL. L.
REV. 202. For cases holding that a judgment is necessary before filing the bill in juris-
dictions where the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is not in force, see In re Bartlett
Oil and Gas Corp., 44 F. (2d) 616, 619 (N. D. Okla. 1930); George E. Sebring Co. v.
O'Rourke, 101 Fla. 885, 891, 134 So. 556, 558 (1931); Dunham v. Cox, 10 N. J. Eq. 437,
466 (1855); GLENN op. cit. supra note 2, § 77. Contra: Brooks v. Gibson, 75 Tenn. 271,
274 (1881) (no judgment necessary before filing bill to set conveyance aside).
6. The Connecticut law is typical, permitting attachment upon filing of the complaint.
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5712. See also American Trust Co. v. Kaufman, 276 Pa. 35, 41,
119 Atl. 749, 752 (1923); GLENN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.
7. See Dargan v. Waring, 11 Ala. 988, 996 (1847); Rappleye v. The International Bank,
93 Ill. 396, 400 (1879); Lippincott v. Smith, 69 N. J. Eq. 787, 789, 64 At1. 141, 142 (1906).
8. Howard v. Railway Co., 101 U. S. 837, 845 (1879); In re Lowe, supra note 3; Jack-
son v. Holbrook, supra note 2; cf. Reeves v. Johnson, 12 N. J. L. 29, 33 (1830).
9. Reeves v. Johnson, supra note 8; Dunham v. Cox, supra note 5; Vansciver v. Bryan,
13 N. J. Eq. 434, 435 (1861); Clement v. Kaighn, 15 N. J. Eq. 47, 57 (1862); Wills v.
McKinney, 41 N. J. L. 120, 123 (1879); Bogert v. Lydecker, 45 N. J. L. 314 (1883); Lip-
pincott v. Smith, supra note 7; N. J. ComP. STAT. (1910) p. 4676, § 9. It has been held
that a junior judgment creditor who levies execution but has not sold the property under
execution obtains priority. Den ex dem. Smith v. Young, 12 N. J. L. 300 (1831).
10. Griffith v. Posey, 98 Ga. 475, 25 S. E. 515 (1896); Jackson v. Holbrook, supra
note 2; Slattery v. Jones, 96 Mo. 216, 8 S. W. 554 (1888). Contra: Dargan v. Waring,
supra note 7.
11. Rockhill v. Hanna, 15 How. 189 (U. S. 1853) (judgments on same day; first execu-
tion gives priority); Bliss v. Watkins, 16 Ala. 229 (1849) (judgments on same day; first
to begin execution obtains priority); Elston v. Castor, 101 Ind. 426, 440 (1884) (if liens
are equal, first execution prevails); Shirley' v. Brown, 80 Mo. 244 (1883) (judgments at
same time or in same term have equal liens; first execution prevails). Contra: Hulbert v.
Hulbert, 216 N. Y. 430, 441, 111 N. E. 70, 73 (1916) (execution by junior judgment credi-
tor or one having an equal lien will not grant priority over senior judgment creditor. There
was a strong dissent); Zink v. James River National Bank, 58 N. D. 1, 224 N. W. 901
(1929).
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taneously. In this situation again the first to levy execution acquires priority.' 2
In other jurisdictions it has been held that the liens attach to such property when
it is acquired but retain priority in accordance with the respective dates of entry of
the judgments, regardless of the order of execution. 13
When, as in the principal case, several creditors are seeking satisfaction out of
property fraudulently conveyed, the problem of. determining who is most diligent
is complicated by the application of language and concepts which are used primarily
when the contest is between one creditor and the debtor or between the latter as
grantor and his grantee. Statutes generally provide that a deed in fraud of creditors
is valid between grantor and grantee but void as to a defrauded creditor.' 4 Some
courts have held that the conveyance is merely voidable by the creditor and that
the debtor retains no leviable interest in the land.' 5 In these jurisdictions a judg-
ment creditor must first obtain an equitable decree setting the conveyance aside
before he can levy execution.16 Thereafter, the priority between creditors may well
be determined by the same standard as is generally used when the debtor obtains
property after the entry of the judgments, namely, that of the order of levy of exe-
cutions.17 However, when the conveyance has been called voidable, it has some-
times been held that the first creditor to apply to equity in such jurisdictions is the
most diligent and deserves priority regardless of the order of executions.18 But it
is more practical to hold, as was done in the instant case, that a deed in fraud of
creditors is utterly void as to them, and that they may treat the property as belong-
ing to the debtor.19 Thus in jurisdictions following this theory a creditor may obtain
a judgment and levy execution on the land without first applying to a court of equity
to have the conveyance set aside.20 This creditor, by completing his law action
through levy and execution on particular land before any other has obtained an equi-
table decree nullifying the conveyance of that land to a third party, dearly seems to
have been the more diligent and, if diligence is to be rewarded, to deserve priority.
There are holdings to this effect. 2 ' On the other hand, if a creditor had applied to
12. Hertweck v. Fearon, 180 Cal. 71, 179 Pac. 190 (1919). But cf. Kisterson v. Tate,
94 Iowa 665, 63 N. W. 350 (1895) (judgment liens attach simultaneously on after-acquired
property, but prompt levy of execution cannot affect priorities).
13. Messinger v. Eckenrode, 162 Md. 63, 68, 158 Atl. 357, 359 (1932); Creighton v.
Leeds, Palmer & Co., 9 Ore. 215 (1881) (based on statutory wording). In Pennsylvania
apparently judgments are 'not liens on property acquired after docketing. In re Marcus,
32 F. (2d) 719 (W. D. Pa. 1929).
14. See UNxioRM FRAUDULENT CoNVEyA NCF AcT, § 7; N. J. Comi'. STAT. (1910) p.
2618; GLENN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 114.
15. Miller v. Sherry, 2 Wall. 237, 249 (U. S. 1864); Lyon v. Robbins, 46 Ill. 276, 279
(1867) ; GLFNN, op. cit. supra note 2, 132. But cf. Slattery v. Jones, supra note 10, at 224,
8 S. W. at 557.
16. See FREEmAx, Jun myars (5th ed. 1925) § 954.
17. See note 12, supra.
18. Dargan v. Waring and Rappleye v. The International Bank, both supra note 7.
19. This was the holding in McKinney, Gilmore & Co. v. The Farmers' National Bank,
104 Ill. 180 (1882); Stelle v. Dennis, supra note 3; Lambert v. Reisman Co., 207 Iowa 711,
719, 223 N. W. 541, 546 (1929); Michaud v. Michaud, supra note 3; Jackson v. Holbrook,
supra note 2; Feuer v. Schaller, 115 Misc. 229, 187 N. Y. Supp. 530 (Sup. Ct. 1921); and
Ecker v. Switzer, 17 Ohio App. 90 (1922).
20. McKinney, Gilmore & Co. v. The Farmers' National Bank, supra note 19; also cases
cited in note 2, supra.
21. See discussion in Levy, Loeb & Co. v. Marx, 18 So. 575, 576 (Miss. 1895).
a court of equity to have the conveyance set aside before any other creditor levied
execution, it seems equally clear that his pursuit of this remedy would have been as
diligent, and would have entitled him to as much preference as the creditor who com-
pleted his legal remedies before applying to equity.22 Some courts have followed
this reasoning by granting priority to the one who has first gone into equity.2 3 Both
of these results can be brought under the rule of preference for the "most diligent
creditor" by defining that phrase in this context as meaning "the one who first shows
an intention to seek satisfaction out of particular property of the debtor."24 Indeed,
this formula might well be applied to the determination of the order of priority of
all creditors seeking satisfaction of their debts from the debtor's land.
In view of the courts' interpretation of the New Jersey statute as giving priority
to the first creditor to levy execution, the decision in the instant case seems mani-
festly proper. Yet the wisdom of arbitrarily rewarding the most diligent creditor
appears questionable. To do so may result in giving priority to certain alert credi-
tors, quick to start collection machinery in motion, at the expense of others for
whom sympathy is often aroused because they have been patiently carrying the
debtor for a long time, or because they appear to need more protection from a strict
application of the law. Statutory amendments would be necessary in practically
all states to change the procedure.25 One of the favored suggestions is to treat a
debtor's property as held equally for the benefit of all creditors who apply for pay-
ment, recognizing their community of interest in the property, and yet not requiring
bankruptcy proceedings.206 Such a method would eliminate granting priority to the
first creditor to start legal proceedings, and would eliminate the litigation required
in the instant case in order to determine who is to be paid first from the debtor's
property. This device seems more desirable than the "race of diligence," which in
case of a deficiency of assets inevitably and unnecessarily results in an unequal
distribution among conflicting claimants.
INTERPRETATION o DEED OF TRUST: DISTINCTION BETWEEN STOCK DIVMENDS AND
DIVIDENDS OF STOCK
IN 1918 a number of shares of stock of the General Electric Company were placed
in trust under a deed which provided that the income thereof be paid to stated bene-
ficiaries, and which further provided that "any and all stock dividends" on "any
22. GLENN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 93. Contra: Tucker v. Foster, 154 Va. 182, 193, 152
S. E. 376, 379 (1930) (on ground that the bill to set the conveyance aside is to enforce the
lien and not to create one).
23. Lyon v. Robbins, supra note 15; Boyle v. Maroney, 73 Iowa 70, 76, 35 N. W. 145,
147 (1887); Gordon v. Lowell, 21 Me. 251, 257 (1842). Contra: McKinney Gilmore & Co.
v. The Farmers' National Bank, supra note 19; White's Bank of Buffalo v. Farthing, 101
N. Y. 344, 4 N. E. 734 (1886); see Wilkinson v. Paddock, 57 Hun. 191, 197 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1890).
24. See Brooks v. Gibson, supra note 5, at 275; Foley v. Ruley, 50 W. Va. 158, 171,
40 S. E. 382, 387 (1901).
25. See Hertweck v. Fearon, supra note 12, at 73, 179 Pac. at 190; Messinger v. Ecken-
rode, supra note 13, at 67, 158 AUt. at 358; GLENN, op. ct. supra note 2, § 93.
26. An extended discussion of this subject appears in Sturges and Cooper, Credit Admin-
istration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 487.
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,stock" held thereunder should return to the settlor free of the trust.1 Subsequently,
in 1925, the corporation caused to be distributed to its shareholders stock of the
Electric Bond and Share Securities Corporation, to which had been transferred
the stock of a subsidiary of the General Electric Company. The latter stock previ-
ously had been a capital asset of the parent corporation.2  Regular stock dividends
were thereafter declared and paid by the Electric Bond and Share Company.
successor to the Securities Corporation, in its own stocks. After the death of the
settlor in 1926, action was brought by the trustee to determine whether the dis-
tribution by the General Electric Company of stock representing the value of its
subsidiary, was a stock dividend within the meaning of the deed of trust and hence
to revert to the settlor's estate; or whether it was not such a "stock dividend,"
but was to be considered as either principal or income of the trust estate. The
trustee also requested that if this stock were to be allocated as part of the principal
of the trust estate, the court should order the disposition of dividends paid thereon.
On the theory that the phrase "stock dividends" is a technical expression, signifying
only dividends paid in the stock of the declaring corporation, the court concluded
that the distribution of Electric Bond and Share Securities Corporation stock by
the General Electric Company was not such a "stock dividend" as to revert to
the donor's estate, but constituted part of the principal of the trust fund.3 The
stock dividends of the Electric Bond and Share Company, apparently represent-
ing current profits, were also held not to be reserved to the settlor by the deed, and
were awarded to the beneficiaries of the trust as income. 4
It is not unusual for stock dividends to be defined as only those dividends that
are paid in the stock of the declaring corporation, thus distinguishing them from
dividends that are paid either in cash, in the stock of another corporation, or in
other assets.5 In accounting practice the definition is important only to designate
a dividend which does not reduce the corporate assets, but transfers surplus to cap-
ital on the corporate books, either retaining that surplus in the business to permit
expansion, or to portray more accurately an expansion in fixed assets that has al-
ready taken place.0 The same definition of a stock dividend is likewise used by
courts which follow the so called Massachusetts rule, for the added purpose of de-
termining whether various kinds of dividends received by a trust estate are to be
allocated to principal or income." These courts apparently believe that it would
be too difficult to determine whether, from an economic standpoint, a given dividend
1. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Ernst, 263 N. Y. 342, 189 N. E. 241 (1934).
2. For this, and further facts of the case, see City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Ernst,
235 App. Div. 157, 256 N. Y. Supp. 577 (lst Dep't 1932). In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Jame-
son, 256 Mass. 179, 182, 152 N. E. 52, 53 (1926), the same dividend is described as represent-
ing an investment of surplus earnings, carried as a separate investment by the General
Electric Company.
3. The dividend was allocated to principal as distinguished from income because it was
derived from a depreciation of capital. Matter of Rogers, 161 N. Y. 108, 55 N. E. 393
(1899); U. S. Trust Co. v. Heye, 224 N. Y. 242, 120 N. E. 645 (1918); Bourne v. Bourne,
240 N. Y. 172, 148 N. E. 180 (1925).
4. Cf. In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927).
5. For critical analyses see Warren, Taxability of Stock (1920) 33 HARv. L. Rav. 835,
887, 888; Isaacs, Principal--Quantum or Res (1933) 46 HAtav. L. REV. 776.
6. DaWnG, THE FiNAxcmL Por.ic or CoaroRAnoNs (rev. ed. 1926) 567, 568; GRAHAM &
KATz Accouuqmo a LAw PRAcncE (1932) 143, 144.
7. Gray v. Hiemenway, 212 Mass. 239, 241, 98 N. E. 789, 790 (1912); Equitable Trust
Co. v. Prentice, 250 N. Y. 1, 12, 164 N. E. 723, 725 (1929).
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represents earnings or capital.8 The same difficulty, encountered in attempts sim-
ilarly to allocate extraordinary cash dividends, had been resolved by arbitrarily al-
locating them to income even though in effect they constituted a distribution of
capital.0 And here those courts again see fit to favor administrative simplicity by
holding that dividends paid in the stocks of other than the declaring corporation
are a distribution of assets, similar in effect to distribution of cash, and should
likewise be treated as income.10 Conversely it is held that "stock dividends"
are clearly not a distribution of assets and should be treated as principal.11
The majority of American jurisdictions have, however, gone beyond the form
of the transaction, and have sought a "more equitable" division in similar circum-
stances, apportioning dividends between a beneficiary and a remainderman in terms
of source. 12 To the extent that a dividend distributes a surplus existing at the crea-
tion of the trust, it is allocated to principal; 13 to the extent that it distributes sur-
plus earned thereafter, it is considered income, whether distributed in cash, assets
or stock of the declaring corporation. 14 Under such treatment, the distinction be-
tween stock dividends and dividends in stock is of no significance and has not been
definitely drawn.' 5 In fact, in the same year that the deed of trust in question was
made, the New York Court, distributing under a will a dividend paid in the stock of
the subsidiary of the declaring corporation, apparently considered that "stock divi-
dends" included not only dividends paid in the stock of the declaring corporation,
but also dividends paid in the stock of a subsidiary.10 And, although since that time
a statute has been enacted that clearly distinguishes between these kinds of divi-
dends,1r it might well be argued that in an instrument drawn before the statute
the words did.not have such a restricted meaning but included the dividends in
question.
It does not appear, however, that the court's technical interpretation of the words
has in any way defeated the intention of the settlor, or reached an otherwise ob-
8. See In re Hagen's Will, 262 N. Y. 301, 305, 186 N. E. 792, 793 (1933); Note (1925)
34 YAL. L. J. 195, 197; Uniform Principal and Income Act, drafted by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1931).
9. Davis v. Jackson, 152 Mass. 58, 25 N. E. 21 (1890); Hemenway v. Hemenway,
181 Mass. 406, 63 N. E. 919 (1902); Hyde v. Holmes, 198 Mass. 287, 84 N. E. 318 (1908);
Gray v. Hemenway, 206 Mass. 126, 92 N. E. 31 (1910).
10. Gray v. Hemenway, supra note 7; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Jameson, supra note 2;
ci. Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347 (1918); United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 (1921).
11. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (1889); Mnot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868).
12. Note (1924) 34 YALY L. J. 195.
13. U. S. Trust Co. v. Heye, supra note 3; Macy v. Ladd, 227 N. Y. 670, 125 N. E.
829 (1920) ; Sturgis v. Roche, 247 N. Y. 585, 161 N. E. 192 (1928) ; cf. Matter of Jackson,
258 N. Y. 281, 179 N. E. 496 (1932); see Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, supra note 7.
14. In re Harteau, 204 N. Y. 292, 97 N. E. 726 (1912); In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450,
103 N. E. 723 (1913) ; Pratt v. Ladd, 253 N. Y. 213, 170 N. E. 895 (1930) ; Earp's Appeal,
28 Pa. 368 (1857); In re Harkness' Estate, 283 Pa. 464, 129 Atl. 458 (1925); In re Nird-
linger's Estate, supra note 4. The only exception to this rule is that ordinary cash divi-
dends are always allocated to income. See Bourne v. Bourne, supra note 3, at 176, 148
N. E. at 181.
15. Recent cases in New York have distinguished stock dividends and dividends in
stock, but for other reasons. People ex rel. Clark v. Gilchrist, 243 N. Y. 173, 153 N. E.
39 (1926); Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, supra note 7.
16. Matter of Megrue, 224 N. Y. 284, 120 N. E. 651 (1918).
17. N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW (1926) § 17a.
jectionable result. Prior to the creation of the trust, the General Electric Company
had declared various stock dividends and had announced a policy of paying 4%
stock dividends semi-annually in addition to cash dividends.' 8 From this it would
appear that the donor intended to keep part of the income for himself, and to give
to the beneficiaries the ordinary cash dividends. It is not at all clear that he in-
tended to reduce the cash value of the estate by reserving to himself liquidating
dividends, although had the corporation chosen to issue stock dividends of the same
value, they would have returned to the donor, thereby reducing the value of the
trust estate. But since the intention can hardly be determined, and since the effect of
the present decision is to maintain intact the principal of the trust, no reason appears
why the court should be deeply concerned to find an intention that probably was
never formulated. Beyond this, the decision could be justified from the view point
of administrative convenience, a ground that has frequently influenced other courts
in similar instances, and that has been advanced as an argument to induce more
general conformance with the Massachusetts rule already discussed.19  But if ad-
ministrative convenience was a controlling factor in determining distribution of
stock interests in the instant case, it is surprising that the court disregarded the
explicit language of the deed in disposing of the stock dividends declared on the
Electric Bond and Share stock. In spite of clear words to the effect that "any and
all stock dividends" of "any stock" held under the deed should go to the settlor, the
court sought to read into the deed an intention to refer to stock dividends of only
the General Electric Company, and gave the dividends of the Electric Bond and
Share corporation to the beneficiaries as income. It would rather seem that the
easiest method of avoiding administrative difficulty in trust estates would be the
use of technical formulae, as the Massachusetts rule, and a narrow interpretation
of the words of the deed. The court in this case seems inconsistent in first limiting
the intention of the settlor "to the words of art used by him," and then shifting its
position, when distributing stock dividends of the Electric Bond and Share Company,
to find the "real intention" of the settlor.
RELITIGATION OF JUDGMENT ADMITTED UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
THE constitution of California' and statutes enacted thereunder 2 provided that any
stockholder in a corporation doing business in that state should be liable for such
proportion of the debts of the corporation as the amount of stock or shares owned
by him bears to the whole of the subscribed capital stock. An Oregon corporation
was formed for the purpose of doing business in California in the course of which
it incurred a liability to the plaintiff. The provisions for stockholders' liability were
subsequently repealed, but without affecting any liability that had been incurred
thereunder.3 Plaintiff recovered a California judgment against the corporation, but
the judgment remained unsatisfied. In a suit in Oregon against a stockholder to
enforce the statutory liability, the plaintiff introduced the California judgment and
rested, claiming that in California such a judgment had the effect of prima facie
evidence of the stockholders' liability and that under the terms of the full faith
18. See note 2, supra.
19. See note 8, supra.
1. CaL. Co NsT. (Treadwell, 1931) art. 12, § 3.
2. CAL.. Civ. ConE (Deering, 1923) § 322.
3. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 257.
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and credit clause it should be given the same effect in Oregon. The Oregon court
refused to give the judgment such effect and the plaintiff was nonsuited. Upon appeal
the nonsuit was affirmed on the ground that the California judgment did not conclude
the liability of the defendant stockholder, and that full faith and credit need be given
only to judgments sought to be enforced against parties directly bound thereby.
4
It might well be questioned whether the judgment against the corporation should
not conclude the liability of a stockholder who is under a statutory duty to pay a
portion of the corporation's debts. To refuse the judgment this effect is to permit
a relitigation of questions that might have been decided, causing the creditor con-
siderable expense and difficulty in enforcing the individual liability of the several
stockholders.0 On the other hand, the fact that there is an attempt to enforce this
stockholder's liability may indicate that at the time of suit the corporation was so
hopelessly insolvent that there was no incentive for it to offer a proper defense.
Such lack of incentive on the part of the principal debtor might well be a sufficient
reason for allowing relitigation of the entire question.7 For similar reasons it has
been held that a surety s or an indemnitor9 may relitigate questions that have already
been decided against their respective principals. It is, however, difficult to see why
the court was concerned with this question. It is clear that in California a judgment
against a corporation does not conclude the liability of a stockholder, but has only
the effect of prima facie evidence in a suit against him,10 and no more was claimed
by the plaintiff.
It does not follow, however, that because the judgment in question was not bind-
ing upon the present defendant it need not be accorded, under the full faith and
credit clause, "such' faith and credit" as it has "by law or usage" in California." The
language of this clause would seem to indicate an intention to preserve intact in all
states a legal status that has been created by the laws of another state.12 More-
4. Bartholomae Oil Corporation v. Booth, 28 P. (2d) 1083 (Ore. 1934).
5. Cf. Ball v. Reese, 58 Kan. 614, 50 Pac. 875 (1897).
6. The rights of the. creditor in the instant case flowed from a complicated contract
whose provisions required thorough investigation. Relitigation would cause much delay
and expense. See Bartholomae Oil Corporation v. Oregon Oil and Development Co., 106
Cal. App. 57, 288 Pac. 814 (1930).
7. The New York courts have recognized this possibility. In Miller v. White, 50 N. Y.
137 (1872), the court held that where proof of the indebtedness would not be a great
burden on the creditor, it would be required because of the possibility that the original
judgment had been obtained by fraud or connivance. Similarly see McMahon v. Macy,
51 N. Y. 155 (1872). In Assets Realization Co. v. Howard, 211 N. Y. 430, 105 N. E.
680 (1914), the possibility that the original action had not been contested was deemed
to be a reason for not admitting the judgment. See also, Tripp v. Huncheon, 82 Ind. 307
(1882).
8. A.mFs, CAsEs ON SUR=sF P (1901) 142, n. 1. See Drummond v. Preston, 12
Wheaton 515, 519 (U. S. 1827) (judgment against principal prima fade evidence against
a surety).
9. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Gest, 183 App. Div. 548, 170 N. Y. Supp. 808
(1st Dep't 1918). See von Moschzisker, Res Judicata (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 299, 304.
10. Ellsworth v. Bradford, 186 Cal. 316, 199 Pac. 335 (1921).
11. "Records and Judicial proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and
credit given them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage
in the courts of the State from which they are taken." 1 STAT. 122 (1790) [revised by
2 STAT. 299 (1804) and REv. STAT. § 905 (1875)], 28 U. S. C. § 687 (1926).
12. Cf. Royal Arcanum ,v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915); Modern Woodmen v. Mixer,
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over, the clear words of the provision would seem to require that to accomplish
this purpose the California judgment should be given by the Oregon court the very
effect that it would have in the California courts, where it would be prima facie
evidence of the stockholder's liability. The Oregon court refused to give it this
effect on the theory that when a judgment has been admitted under this clause, it
may be attacked only for reasons of fraud or lack of jurisdiction, and that to admit
it as prima fade evidence and then permit relitigation would not be according it
full faith and credit. It is true that where a judgment rendered in one state is
sought to be enforced in the courts of another state against a party bound by the
judgment, the effect of the full faith and credit clause is to prevent relitigation.
Under this clause a judgment may be attacked on the same grounds that are avail-
able in the state where it was rendered, which are usually fraud13 and lack of juris-
diction.14 But if a judgment is such that there are other available grounds of
attack which would permit relitigation in the court where it was rendered, there is
nothing to indicate that relitigation is forbidden by the full faith and credit clause,
and the status of the litigants would in that way be preserved according to the
law of the jurisdiction where that status was created.15
The Supreme Court has sanctioned exceptions to the mandate of the full faith and
credit clause, not for any such reason as now advanced by the Oregon court, but
because strict enforcement of the clause in some cases would violate an important
local policy.' 6 Thus full faith and credit need not be accorded to a decree of a
foreign state transferring title to land in the state where enforcement is sought.'
7
Similarly one state need not recognize divorce decrees of its citizens secured in other
states, if its own policy in the matter would thereby be violated.' 8 However, no
such conflict of policy appears in the instant case, the question being analogous
to the enforcement of an ordinary commercial contract.19 The defendant purchased
stock of the corporation knowing that he would become liable for a share of its
267 U. S. 544 (1925); Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc., v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932),
noted in (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rmv. 131, (1932) 46 HARV. L. Rzv. 291, (1932) 42 YALE L. J.
115; Note (1930) 40 Y=rE L. J. 291; see dissent of Stone, J.'in Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 188 (1933), noted in (1934) 47 HAuv. L. Rzv. 712, (1934) 43 YALr
L. J. 648. But cf. Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rzv. 131; Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit
Clause," 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 371, 386.
13. Warrington v. BaHll 90 Fed. 464 (C. C. A. 3d, 1898); Hare v. Reily, 269 S. W. 473
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925). But where fraud would not be a ground for collateral attack in
the home state, it may not be used in the state where the judgment is to be enforced.
Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290 (U. S. 1866); Union Trust Co. v. Rochester & P. PRr. Co.,
29 Fed. 609 (C. C. Pa. 1886).
14. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (U. S. 1850); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714
(1877); National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257 (1904).
15. If the judgment were conclusive against the stockholder in the California courts
there would be no question but that it would be conclusive in the courts of Oregon.
Hancock v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640 (1900); Warrington v. Ball, supra note 13.
16. Corwin, supra note 12; see dissenting opinion of Stone, J. in Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, supra note 12.
17. Olmsted v. Olnsted, 216 U. S. 386 (1910).
18. Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Iowa 142, 130 N. W. 785; In re Estate of Ommang, 183
Minn. 92, 235 N. W. 529 (1931); see Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 575 (1906).
19. Cf. Flash v. Conn., 109 U. S. 371 (1883) ; Huntington v. Attril, 146 U. S. 657 (1892);
Whitman v. Oxford National Bank, 176 U. S. 559 (1900); Hohfeld, The Nature of the
Individual Liability of Stockholders to Creditors (1909) 9 CoL. L. Rv. 285.
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debts according to the laws of California. No reason appears why he should not
be considered as having contracted not only with respect to the fact of liability, but
also as to the manner of its enforcement. This would include an agreement that a
judgment against the corporation would be prima facie evidence of his statutory
liability.20 To give the judgment such effect would of course permit the defendant
to relitigate the question of the corporation's liability. The practical effect of this
disposition would be to give the plaintiff a material advantage, for he could bring suit
by merely entering the judgment in court, leaving it to the defendant to decide
whether the expense and trouble of preparing a defense to a claim arising in Cali-
fornia were justified by the chance of winning the suit. There is no reason, however,
why this task should not first be faced by the defendant here, as would be the case in
California.
DISQUALIFICATION OF TRUSTEES IN BANKRUPTCY FOR PREJUDICIAL AssoCIATIONS
IN view of the nature of the duties with which a trustee in bankruptcy is charged,
any relation which he entertains with persons having interests adverse to those of
the estate is viewed with suspicion as an "entangling alliance" rendering impartial
performance of his duty improbable.' Discovery of such a prejudicial association
has repeatedly led to the disapproval of a trustee elected by creditors, or, less fre-
quently, to the removal of an incumbent in office.
By judicial interpretation, the Federal Bankruptcy Act has been construed to make
the initial election of a trustee by creditors subject to the approval of the referee or
judge.2  The reported cases indicate that the most usual basis for the resulting
power of disapproval appears when the trustee has been shown to be directly or in-
directly connected with the bankrupt himself.3 Thus a former attorney of the
20. Where a statute provided that violation of a speed limit was prima fade evidence
of negligence, the presumption thus created was said to be part of the law of evidence
and hence a question of procedure to be governed by the law of the forum rather than
by the law of the place where the action arose. Davis Cabs, Inc., v. Evans, 42 Ohio App.
493, 182 N. E. 327 (1932). But see Note (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 286; Bohlen, The Effect of
Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof (1920) 68 U. or PA. L. REv.
307. The question of full faith and credit was not discussed.
1. In re Rekersdres, 108 Fed. 206 (S. D. N. Y. 1901); In re Dayville Woolen Co., 114
Fed. 674 (D. Conn. 1902); In re N. S. Dalsimer & Co., 56 F. (2d) 644 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
2. Literal interpretation of the Act restricts court supervision to mechanical recogni-
tion of trustees elected by creditors, and appointment when they fail to agree, 30 STAT. 546,
557 (1898), 11 U. S. C. §§ 11(17), 72 (1926); but by General Order In Bankruptcy No. 13
a provision of the prior act of 1867, 14 STAT. 522 (1867), providing for the disapproval
power, was in effect reinstated. In re Eastlack, 145 Fed. 68 (D. N. J. 1906); In re Kreuger,
196 Fed. 705 (E. D. Ky. 1911). It is generally held, however, that a candidate elected
by creditors should be disqualified only for substantial reasons. In re Merritt Construction
Co., 219 Fed. 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914). Such reasons are to be determined largely in the
discretion of the referee. ln re Scott, 53 F. (2d) 89 (W. D. Mich. 1931).
3. A trustee is occasionally disapproved for procedural defects in his election, as where
all creditors were not notified that the meeting was to be held. In re Evening Standard
Publishing Co., 164 Fed. 517 (N. D. N. Y. 1908). Note also the statutory requirement
that a trustee reside or maintain an office in the judicial district. 30 STAT. 557 (1898),
11 U. S. C. § 73 (1926).
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bankrupt has been disqualified from serving as trustee,4 and approval of a stock-
holder and attorney of a corporate bankrupt has been refused upon a showing that
the corporation's former management was under attack.6 Likewise, disqualification
has resulted where the trustee has been elected by the active influence of the
bankrupt 6 or his attorney.7 Indeed, the mere voting of creditors' claims by those
associated with the bankrupt is disfavored, and consequently approval has been
denied a trustee elected by creditors' proxies cast by a present s or by a former0
attorney of the bankrupt. It is only occasionally that the inflexibility of the deci-
sions refusing to sanction trustee association with the bankrupt has been tempered,
as in holdings countenancing the election of trustees through votes cast by relatives
of a bankrupt'0 and officers of a bankrupt corporation" as creditors in their
own right, or where sufficient basis has existed for judicial confidence in the can-
didate despite the disfavored association.' 2
Prejudicial associations of ra trustee with parties other than the bankrupt,
moreover, have constituted an additional ground for disapproval. Thus any associa-
tion of the candidate with the receiver of the bankrupt, or with the bankrupt's
assignee for the benefit of creditors, is viewed with suspicion, through fear of pos-
sible collusion in concealing improper administration by the latter parties. Con-
sequently, solicitations of creditors' votes, in the interest of a particular candidate,
by a receiver's or by assignees14 have been held fatal to the candidacy. Yet
4. In re Wink, 206 Fed. 348 (D. Md. 1913) (considering other factors as well).
5. In re Gordon Supply & Manufacturing Co., 129 Fed. 622 (M. D. Pa. 1904). But
cf. In re Syracuse Paper & Pulp Co., 164 Fed. 275 (N. D. N. Y. 1908); In re Day Lum-
ber Co., 8 F. (2d) 146 (W. D. Wash. 1925). A candidate whom the referee found "inter-
ested" in the bankrupt's affairs has been held to be disqualified. In re Van de Mark, 175
Fed. 287 (W. D. N. Y. 1910).
6. In re White, 15 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); In re Bloomberg, 48 F. (2d)
635 (D. Minn. 1931); see In re Lloyd, 148 Fed. 92, 93 (E. D. Wis. 1906); cf. Falter v.
Reinhard, 104 Fed. 292 (S. D. Ohio, 1900). But cf. In re Morton, 118 Fed. 908 (D. Mass.
1902).
7. In r,- Hanson, 156 Fed. 717 (D. Minn. 1904). Likewise activity of officers and
directors of a bankrupt corporation is discouraged. Cf. Wilson v. Continental Building &
Loan Association, 232 Fed. 824 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916).
8. In re Rekersdres, supra note 1; cf. In re Sitting, 182 Fed. 917 (N. D. N. Y. 1910).
9. In re Dayville Woolen Co., supra note 1 (refused to answer questions as to present
relations with the bankrupt); cf. In re E. A. Walker & Co., 204 Fed. 132 (N. D. Ala.
1913). But cf. In re Cooper, 135 Fed. 196 (E. D. Pa. 1905); In re Sodus Packing Co., 1
F. Supp. 445 (W. D. N. Y. 1932).
10. In re Ployd, 183 Fed. 791 (M. D. Pa. 1910) (brother-in-law voted). A bank-
rupt's wife has been denied a vote in a close election. In re Ballantine, 232 Fed. 271
N. D. N. Y. 1916) ; cf. In re Sitting, supra note 8.
11. In re Syracuse Paper & Pulp Co., supra note 5; In re L. W. Day & Co., 178 Fed. 545
(C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
12. In re Ketterer Manufacturing Co., 155 Fed. 987 (M. D. Pa. 1907). A director
and stockholder of a bankrupt corporation who had solicited his own election in order
to finish outstanding construction contracts was approved as trustee, where the estate was
near liquidation. In re Merritt Construction Co., supra note 2. See also In re Fisher, 193
Fed. 104 (M. D. Pa. 1911).
13. In re Western States Building-Loan Association, 54 F. (2d) 415 (S. D. Cal. 1931);
cf. General Order In Bankruptcy No. 39. But cf. In re Bronx Ice Cream Co., 66 F. (2d)
620 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
14. Cf. In re Stowe, 235 Fed. 463 (N. D. Cal. 1916). The election of a trustee should
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elections of receivers themselves as trustees are frequently approved,1' as are, in a
lesser degree, elections of assignees."6 In similar fashion, association with a cred-
itor whose claim against the estate is in dispute has resulted in disapproval of a
trustee. The trustee is, in reality, a representative of creditors, 17 and accordingly
the more overt connections between them and their candidates are not put in ques-
tion.' s8 Solicitation by creditors for a particular candidate' 9 has been held not to
be operative against him, and the election as trustee of a creditor 20 or his at-
torney2l has been approved. But a trustee may not owe his election to creditors
whose claims may be involved in litigation with the estate,22 if the danger of liti-
gation is based on an actual challenge of the claim; 23 and he has been held to be dis-
qualified from serving where proved to be an employee and stockholder of such a
creditor corporation which had solicited proxies for him.
24
A trustee in office is subject to removal proceedings, upon complaint of creditors;25
but it is seldom that the principle of prejudicial associations is utilized to effect
such removal. This is due largely to the indifference of creditors in instituting such
actions and to the effect of elimination in previous disapproval proceedings of per-
be disapproved in whose selection the attorney for the assignee directly or indirectly par-
ticipated. In re Forestier, 222 Fed. 537 (N. D. Cal. 1915).
15. In re Huddleston, 167 Fed. 428 (S. D. Ga. 1908); In re Foley, 1 F. (2d) 568 (S. D.
Cal. 1924).
16. it re Blue Ridge Packing Co., 125 Fed. 619 (M. D. Pa. 1903). Contra: In re
Kellar, 192 Fed. 830 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912); In re Zuky, 18 F. (2d) 284 (E. D. N. Y. 1926);
Garrison v. Pilloid Cabinet Co., 50 F. (2d) 1035 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
17. In re Hanson, supra note 7; In re Kreuger, supra note 2.
18. In re Foley, supra note 15.
19. In re Callahan, 242 Fed. 479 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917).
20. In re Lewensohn, 98 Fed. 576 (S. D. N. Y. 1899).
21. In re Margolles, 191 Fed. 369 (E. D. N. Y. 1911); W. A. Liller Building Co. v.
Reynolds, 247 Fed. 90 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); In re Mayflower Hat Co., 65 F. (2d) 330
(C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
22. See In re Hartman-Blanchard Co., Inc., 278 Fed. 747 (N. D. N. Y. 1922).
23. In re Lazoris, 120 Fed. 716 (E. D. Wis. 1903). Indirect relation of a trustee
with creditors having interests adverse to those of the estate has failed to result in dis-
approval, where this association was traced through his attorney. In re Archibold &
Hamilton, 237 Fed. 408 (N. D. Cal. 1916), or through former employment, In re Foley,
supra note 15.
24. In re Anson Mercantile Co., 185 Fed. 993 (N. D. Tex. 1911). Another entangling
alliance feared is trustee association with a collection agency, partially because the trustee
fees go to the agency, causing less efficient management, In re Scott, 53 F. (2d) 89 (W. D.
Mich. 1931), but primarily because the trustee may be called upon to assume a partisan
attitude favoring agency clients among the bankrupt's creditors, In re Leader Mercantile
Co., 29 F. (2d) 570 (N. D. Tex. 1928); In re N. S. Dalsimer & Co., supra note 1.
25. 30 STAT. 546 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 11(17) (1926). Compare this with the former
Act giving greater freedom of removal. 14 STAT. 525 (1867). The present statutory pro-
visions have been judicially extended to give power to remove independent of such com-
plaint only on failure of the trustee to make a report, despite the strong argument for
independent removal. In re Lehman, 7 F. (2d) 680 (D. Mont. 1925). See General Order
In Bankruptcy No. 17. The power of removal is customarily exercised only on com-
plaint of creditors, In re Judith Gap Commercial Co., 5 F. (2d) 307 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925),
and after a hearing has been given, In re Judith Gap Commercial Co., 298 Fed. 89
(C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
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sons whose associations are most disfavored. To a great extent, however, leniency
has resulted from a natural disinclination to oust an incumbent and to disturb the
estate, except for clear evidence of misconduct in office.26 Removal of trustees
has occurred for improper performance of duty in refusing 27 or delaying28 to in-
stitute suits to recover assets fraudulently transferred by the bankrupt, or in ap-
propriating for the trustee's benefit property of the estate through irregular advances
in his compensation and through purchase by himself of estate assets.29 But a
disfavored association, which usually arises prior to the election of a trustee,30 is
seldom considered of sufficient weight to justify removal. This fact is demonstrated
by a recent circuit court of appeals' decision in which the court refused to remove
as trustee a former director and present stockholder of a bank being sued by the
bankrupt estate, even though he was also a close social associate of officials of other
banks so sued.3 1 It has indeed been held that prejudicial personal and business
relations existing between the bankrupt and trustee, prior to the latter's approval,
could not even be considered by the court, on the ground that removal may be se-
cured only for cause arising subsequent to the trustee's appointment 32  Specific
removals for prejudicial relations have occurred only where, in addition to the
relation, proven acts of the trustee have demonstrated the association to have im-
paired his impartiality, as in openly favoring the bankrupt at the expense of cred-
itors,33 or in retaining the assignee's attorney as counsel for the estate.3 4
The principle of prejudicial associations has been of some salutary influence in
obtaining impartiality of trustees; but its effectiveness in securing this result has
been seriously restricted, as is indicated by certain reports on the subject.ss Trus-
tees have repeatedly been elected and dominated in their administration by bank-
rupts, receivers, and self-seeking attorneys; and creditors have signally failed,
26. The minor requirements, as of residence, are of course enforced. In re Seider, 163
Fed. 138 (E. D. N. Y. 1908). If a trustee established an office in the district shortly be-
fore the filing of the bankruptcy petition in order to qualify, he may be removed. In re
Pick Barth Holding Corp., 4 F. Supp. 228 (D. Del. 1933).
27. See Rice v. Chapman, 234 App. Div. 279, 283, 255 N. Y. Supp. 39, 40 (lst Dep't
1932).
28. Zimmerman v. Farmington Shoe Co., 31 F. (2d) 405 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929).
29. In re Stephens & Co., 30 F. (2d) 725 (S. D. Cal. 1928). Conduct causing discord
with other trustees, In re Conemaugh Coal Mining Corp., 18 F. (2d) 682 (W. D. Pa. 1926),
or with creditors, Bollman v. Tobin, 239 Fed. 469 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917), has resulted in
the trustee's removal.
30. Where it arises after the appointment, the rules regarding disapproval proceedings
probably apply. A trustee owing his election to a creditor may be removed when the
creditor later becomes adversely interested, through attempting to purchase estate assets.
In re Pick Barth Holding Corp., supra note 26.
31. In re Paramount Publix Corp., 68 F. (2d) 703 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). (The court
refused to remove other trustees having official connections with competitors). Note also
In re Allied Owners' Corp. 4 F. Supp. 684, 957 (E. D. N. Y. 1933).
32. Alabama v. Montevallo Mining Co., 278 Fed. 989 (M. D. Ala. 1922); cf. In re
Holden, 258 Fed. 720 (N. D. N. Y. 1919). Contra: In re Allied Owners' Corp., supra
note 31, at 958.
33. In re Allen B. Wrisley Co., 133 Fed. 388 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904).
34. In re Forestier, supra note 14.
35. See BAxauT'rcy R xoam (Merchants' Association of New York, 1924); DoovAx,
ArnxsTRAio or BAxRuvr EsTATES (1931); Douglas and Marshall, Bankruptcy Ad-
ministration (1932) 32 Cor.. L. REv. 26.
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because of their indifference, either to make certain that their votes were cast for
independent candidates, or to protest the election of trustees by introduction of the
evidence necessary to establish prejudicial relationships. Under these conditions a
policy of inflexible disqualification of trustees for relations with adverse interests is
not only commendable but necessary; and only in removal proceedings, where an
impartial administration is an adequate refutation of claims that a trustee favors
interests other than those of creditors, should judicial hostility to incumbents
fettered by prejudicial associations be somewhat relaxed.
SHOTGUN MARRIAGE AS A DEFENSE IN PROSECUTION FOR NON-SUPPORT
FREQUENTLY statutory provision authorizes criminal prosecution of a husband who
"without just or sufficient cause" fails in his common law duty to support his wife
and children.' A recent South Carolina case involves the application of such a statute,
as well as an inquiry into the scope and method of collateral attack on the validity
of a marriage. In a prosecution for non-support of his wife and child, the defend-
ant alleged that his marriage had been forced upon him "by show of arms" in the
hands of an irate parent, and that he had never willingly consummated the mar-
riage. No annulment proceedings had previously been instituted; nevertheless, the
jury was instructed by the court that "if the defendant entered into the marriage
contract under duress, he would be excused from the legal obligation of supporting
his wife and child." The jury, however, finding no duress, returned a verdict of
guilty and on appeal the instructions and verdict were affirmed.2
The lawful excuses for failure to support a wife are usually confined to desertion
or adultery by the wife, or any other grounds for which a divorce might be granted
to the husband.3 But in all these situations the legality of the marriage itself is
assumed. To determine the validity of the defense raised in the instant case re-
quires an inquiry into the fundamental issue of whether a marriage entered into
through duress is void or voidable. If void, its validity may be attacked in any
court at any time by any person,4 and, if remarriage is desired, no annulment pro-
ceedings are necessary;0 if merely voidable, it may be attacked only in a direct
proceeding for annulment within the lifetime of both parties.6 IncestuousT or
1. Cf. ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 68, § 24; KANS. REv. STAT. Am. (1923)
c. 21, § 442; N. C. CODE AN. (1931) § 4447; ORLA. STAT. (1931) § 1830; ORE. CODE ANN.
(1930) § 845; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 18, § 2160; S. C. CODE (1932) § 1123.
At common law it was not an indictable offense for a husband to desert his wife or aban-
don his children. Stedman v. State, 80 Fla. 547, 86 So. 428 (1920); State v. Bell, 194
N. C. 701, 115 S. E. 190 (1922).
2. State v. Edgins, 171 S. E. 444 (S. C. 1933).
3. People v. Howell, 214 Ill. App. 372 (1919) (desertion); People v. Bliskey, 21 Misc.
433, 47 N. Y. Supp. 974 (Sup. Ct. 1897) (adultery). The determination of just cause
is generally a jury function. State v. Redmond, 150 S. C. 452, 148 S. E. 474 (1929);
and in South Carolina the burden of proving it is on the defendant. State v. Goins, 122
S. C. 192, 115 S. E. 232 (1922). Contra: People v. Goldsand, 207 Ill. App. 372 (1917).
4. Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 737 (1887); Succession of Taylor,
39 La. Ann. 823, 2 So. 581 (1887); Fearnow v. Jones, 34 Okla. 694, 126 Pac. 1015 (1912).
5. Finn v. Finn, 62 How. Pr. 83 (N. Y. 1878).
6. State v. Lowell, 78 Minn. 166, 80 N. W. 877 (1899); In re Guthery's Estate, 226
S. W. 626 (Mo. 1920).
7. Fearnow v. Jones, supra note 4.
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bigamous marriages,8 and those entered into by persons of unsound mind,9 have
almost uniformly been declared void ab initio. On the other hand, marriages
of minors are only voidable at the election of the minor.'0
Unquestionably, under the earlier view in this country, marriages induced by
fraud or duress were deemed wholly void and therefore subject to collateral attack. 1
But the modem trend appears dearly to treat such marriages as merely voidable,
and valid for all purposes until annulled by judicial decree.' 2 This view is dem-
onstrated by a recent Louisiana decision,13 holding that a child of a marriage so
procured was a proper party to contest his father's will. Had the marriage been
regarded as void, the child would have been incapable to contest in the absence of a
statute legitimatizing him.' 4 Further substantiation lies in holdings that a marriage
induced by duress may be ratified by subsequent, voluntary cohabitation; 15 a void
marriage may not be so ratified.' 6 To establish sufficient ground for annulment,
moreover, under this treatment, the duress pleaded must have been such as to place
the aggrieved person in fear of direct bodily harm at the time of the ceremony.'
7
Accordingly a marriage contracted to avoid threatened criminal prosecution, as for
seduction, is not entered into under such fear of physical harm as to warrant a
suit for annulment' 8
The consequences of these two fundamentally divergent attitudes toward a forced
marriage become clearly apparent in a factual situation comparable to that in-
volved in the present case. If the marriage be regarded as voidable, the husband's
criminal responsibility for failure to support his wife and child continues, and the
untoward procurement of the ceremony becomes of no operative significance. Al-
though at first impression it might appear unduly harsh to preclude the husband
in this manner from contending that he had been forced into the marriage, never-
theless, since he had an adequate remedy through annulment proceedings, which
would have relieved him of criminal liability had he chosen to pursue it, it does not
8. MADDEN, DoxmrTsc RELATIONs (1931) § 18.
9. Sothern v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 936 (E. D. Ark. 1926); noted in (1926) 36
YALE L. J. 577
10. State v. Lowell, supra note 6; Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N. W. 379 (1906).
11. Bassett v. Bassett, 9 Bush. 696 (Ky. 1873); Ferlat v. Gojon, 1 Hopk. Ch. 478
(N. Y. 1825); cf. Taylor v. White, 160 N. C. 38, 75 S. E. 941 (1912).
12. Farley v. Farley, 94 Ala. 501, 10 So. 646 (1892); Mason v. Mason, 164 Ark. 59.
261 S. W. 40 (1924); Tyson v. State, 83 Fla. 7, 90 So. 622 (1922).
13. Succession of Barth, 152 So. 543, 544 (La. 1934), wherein the court said: "... a
marriage celebrated according to the forms of law, even though the consent of one of
the parties was compelled by violence and by putting him or her in fear, must be
regarded as a valid marriage until it is annulled by a judicial decree rendered in a direct
action of nullity."
14. Children of a void marriage are illegitimate in the absence of a saving statute,
In re Moncrief's Will, 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550 (1923), and consequently unable to
inherit from either parent. ScHouLzR, DoarsTic RELATIOiS (6th ed. 1921) § 711.
15. Thompson v. Thompson, 148 La. 499, 87 So. 250 (1921); McGill v. McGill, 179
App. Div. 343, 166 N. Y. Supp. 397 (4th Dep't 1917).
16. Williams v. State, 44 Ala. 24 (1870).
17. Owings v. Owings, 141 Md. 416, 118 AUt. 858 (1922). It is of course well settled
that duress is a proper basis for an annulment decree. Fowler v. Fowler, 131 La. 1088, 60
So. 694 (1913).
18. Day v. Day, 236 Mass. 362, 128 N. E. 411 (1920); Johns v. Johns, 41 Tex. 40
(1875).
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seem inequitable to deny him the defense of duress.19 To adopt the less usual view
that the marriage is void necessarily compels a different result, and in recognizing
the availability of the defense of duress, the instructions given by the court in the
instant case apparently assume that the marriage was void. Under such a treat-
ment no criminal liability could exist for any dereliction either as to the wife or the
child, who would be regarded as an illegitimate in the absence of statutory pro-
vision to the contrary in South Carolina.20 While a result of this nature may be
justified in the case of the wife, who has benefited by, and perhaps abetted the
invocation of duress, yet to absolve the father completely of any criminal respon-
sibility for failure to care for the child is to ignore the unfortunate position in
which the latter is left.2 It is his welfare which should elicit the greater concern.
Recognition of this factor is to be found in the statutes of several states legitimatiz-
ing the children of void marriages, 22 or making the father of an illegitimate crim-
inally liable for failure to support him.2 Such a disposition or designation of the
forced marriage as voidable seems, under the circumstances, much more socially
desirable.
REBUTTAL OF THE PRESUMrPTION OF PossIBILITY OF IssuE IN DETERMINING
ESTATE TAX
IN determining the validity of a gift under the rule against perpetuities, the courts
have saved time and avoided uncertainty by indulging in the obviously false presump-
tion that any woman is capable of subsequently bearing children regardless of her age
or physical condition.' Thus where there is a devise to A's children who reach twenty-
five, it would be necessary in order to sustain the gift under the rule against perpetui-
ties to show that A could have no children born after the death of the devisor. But
19. Bostick v. State, 1 Ala. App. 255, 55 So. 260 (1911) ; Tyson v. State, supra note 12;
Dobbins v. State, 208 Pac. 1056 (Okla. 1922). Even the institution of a suit to annul,
not brought to a successful conclusion prior to the trial, is no bar to a conviction for non-
support. State v. Barilleau, 128 La. 1033, 55 So. 664 (1911); State v. Loyacano, 135 La.
945, 66 So. 307 (1914).
20. At common law no legal duty to support an illegitimate child was imposed on its
father. MADDEN, supra note 8, § 105. And the statutes providing for criminal liability
for non-support of a child are applicable only to legitimate children unless expressly
extended. People v. Green, 19 Cal. App. 109, 124 Pac. 871 (1912); Creisar v. State,
97 Ohio St. 16, 119 N. E. 128 (1917).
21. The usual excuses for non-support of a child are the father's own financial inability
or the existence of a sufficient income already available to the child. MADDEN, supra note
8, § 112.
22. Cf. Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2098; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 245.36.
23. Cf. CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 270; MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 273, § 15;
NED. ComnT. STAT. (1929) § 458; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 18, § 2161. Practically
every state has a bastardy proceeding to compel support, which is a civil action.
1. Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox Eq. Cas. 324 (1787); In re Dawson, 39 Ch. D. 155 (1888);
Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N. W. 703 (1930); Stout v. Stout,
44 N. J. Eq. 479, 15 Ati. 843 (1888); GRAY, RrLnt AGAINST Pmza'zrTrums (3d ed. 1915)
§§ 215, 215a. There is apparently only one decision to the contrary. Cooper v. Laroche,
17 Ch. D. 368 (1881). A note to Miller v. Macomb, 26 Vend. 229 (N. Y. 1841) lists ex-
ceptional cases of aged women bearing children.
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the presumption is applied and the gift to the children declared invalid even though
it is known at the time of the testator's death that it is impossible for A to have a
child. Justification may be found for the conclusiveness of this presumption in the
fact that an actual determination of the question would be difficult and could be wrong
where age alone is considered; and in the further fact that even where application
of the presumption makes a gift invalid, it serves the general policy of the rule against
perpetuities in conjunction with which it is used by increasing the alienability of
property. Nor is the presumption necessarily a source of hardship since a will may
be drawn in such a manner that the question will not arise, just as it may be drawn
so that the rule against perpetuities is not otherwise violated. The same question
as to possibility of issue may, however, arise in other types of cases where there is
no sufficient reason to support such a conclusive presumption. Thus where a land
title is defective only for the reason that it is defeasible by birth of subsequent
issue,2 enforcement of a conclusive presumption contrary to fact limits the alienability
of the land. At the time of its creation, such a restriction may be useful to protect
possible issue of a grantee; but subsequent sterility of the grantee without having had
issue robs the provision of its utility. Since this contingency may not arise until
long after the creation of the restriction, it cannot easily be avoided by foresight.
Similar considerations are applicable in cases involving the termination of trusts,3
where there is no reason for their continuance except the possibility of issue, and in
cases involving the settlement of estates.4 A few statutory provisions 5 have made
2. In this situation also the presumption is generally held to be conclusive. Hill v.
Sangamon Loan and Trust Co., 295 fI1. 619, 129 N. E. 554 (1920); Azarch v. Smith, 222
Ky. 566, 1 S. W. (2d) 968 (1928); List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483 (1877); Jordan v. Jordan,
145 Tenn. 378, 239 S. W. 423 (1922); cf. Hill v. Spencer, 196 Ill. 65, 63 N. E. 614 (1902);
Miller v. Macomb, supra note 1; Simpson v. Kamos Realty Co., 223 App. Div. 98, 227
N. Y. Supp. 486 (4th Dep't 1928). Contra: Whitney v. Groo, 40 App. D. C. 496 (1913);
see Bacot v. Fessenden, 130 App. Div. 819, 823, 115 N. Y. Supp. 698, 702 (1st Dep't 1909);
(1922) 22 CoL. L. Rzv. 486. In the cases where specific performance is sought, the diffi-
culty may perhaps be avoided by specifically contracting to pass any such title as the vendor
has. However, where the title is in fact absolute, it seems undesirable thus to restrict the
alienability of the land by indulging in the presumption. See Note (1923) 23 COL. L. Rtv.
50, 52.
3. In this situation the presumption has almost uniformly been held to be conclusive by
American courts. Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 Pac. 425
(1920); Ricards v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 97 Md. 608, 55 Ati. 384 (1903); Application
of Smith, 94 N. J. Eq. 1, 118 Atl. 271 (1922); Bowlin v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust
Co., 31 R. I. 289, 76 Atl. 348 (1910); cf. Towle v. Delano, 144 Mass. 95, 10 N. E. 769
(1887). There is English authority to the contrary. Miles v. Knight, 17 L. J. Eq. 458
(1848); In re White (1901) 1 Ch. 570.
4. The better authority has allowed the presumption tb be rebutted where only distri-
bution of the estate is involved. Johnson v. Beauchamp, 35 Ky. 70 (1837); Male v. Wil-
liams, 48 N. J. Eq. 33, 21 AtI. 854 (1891); Gowen's Appeal, 106 Pa. 288 (1884); Frank v.
Frank, 153 Tenn. 215, 280 S. W. 1012 (1926); see Carney v. Kain, 40 W. Va. 758, 811, 23
S. E. 650, 657 (1895). Contra: Williams v. Frierson, 150 Ga. 797, 105 S. E. 475 (1920);
May v. Bank of Hardinsburg & Trust Co., 150 Ky. 136, 150 S. W. 12 (1912); cf. Sterrett's
Estate, 300 Pa. 116, 150 AtI. 159 (1930); Bigley v. Watson, 98 Tenn. 353, 39 S. W. 525
(1897).
5. These statutes apparently permit the sale of land free of encumbrances, but require
some provision to protect the contingent interests of possible after-born children. Cf. N.J.
it possible to reach a partial solution in the cases involving land titles by permitting
a sale of the land with the proceeds held in trust; and some courts,0 particularly in
England, have been willing to permit a showing of impossibility or even improba-
bility of issue in the settlement of an estate where the interests of living persons are
not thereby affected. But in general the courts have not been realistic in their ap-
proach to the question and have shown a tendency to consider as binding precedents,
cases involving unrelated factual situations.
The question of possibility of issue was presented in still another type of case
recently before the United States Supreme Court.7 The residue of an estate had
been left in trust to pay the income to the testator's daughter for life, "and upon her
death to her lawful issue," with a gift over to various charities if she died without
issue. For the purpose of determining the amount of the estate for tax purposes,
the value of all charitable bequests could be deducted. The government, as defendant
in a suit to recover a tax paid under protest, contended that the law conclusively pre-
sumed a woman capable of bearing children until her death, and that consequently
the gift to the charities was contingent and should be included in the value of the
estate. Undisputed evidence showed that several years prior to the testator's death
the reproductive organs of the daughter had been removed, making her incapable of
bearing children. The court considered that in such a case, where it was conclusively
proved by factors other than age alone that the woman was sterile, the presumption
would not be applied. Accordingly, a recovery for the additional tax paid was allowed.
The instant case would seem to overrule, without specifically mentioning, an earlier
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in which precisely the same point was deter-
mined.8  The desirability of the present result is hardly open to doubt. Although
it is frequently stated that the presumption has been enforced to prevent voluntary
sterilization by beneficiaries in order to vest title to large estates in themselves,9
and to avoid the indelicacy and uncertainty of an inquiry into the possibilities of
further issue10 the force of these reasons is questionable, and they have not always
been given effect. No other reason for the application of the presumption existed
in the principal case. Further, as the Court indicates, to use a presumption admit-
Coap. STAT. (1910) p. 4688-4693; N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1924) p. 3142-3143; N. Y.
RnAL PRop. LAW (1909) § 67-71; N. C. CoDx AN. (Michie, 1931) §§ 1744, 1745; PA. STAT.
ANx. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20 §§ 1561-1566. An even greater degree of alienability is ob-
tained in England. See Bordwell, English Property Reform (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 1, 2; cf.
Apgar v. Apgar, 38 N. J. Eq. 549 (1884) with In re Clement, 57 Atl. 724 (N. J. 1904);
(1928) 38 YALa L. J. 122.
6. Fraser v. Fraser, Jac. 586 (1814) ; Leng v. Hodges, Jac. 585 (1822) ; Brown v. Pringle,
4 Hare 124 (1845); In re Widdows' Trusts, L. R. 11 Eq. 408 (1871); In re Brown's Trust,
L. R. 16 Eq. 239 (1873); see Note (1930) 67 A. L. R. 538, 543; Note (1914) 48 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 865, 868; cases cited supra note 4.
7. United States v. Provident Trust Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 389 (1934); see (1934) 47 HAMv.
L. REv. 1061; (1934) 32 McH. L. Rxv. 414, 702; (1933) 81 U. PA. L. REv. 879.
8. Farrington v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929),
cert. den., 279 U. S. 873 (1929); see (1929) 15 IowA L. REv. 100. However, the evidence
as to impossibility of issue was not as clear as in the principal decision.
9. Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank, supra note 3; Hill v. Sangamon Loan
and Trust Co., supra note 2; Ricards v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.; Application of Smith,
both supra note 3; List v. Rodney, supra note 2.
10. See cases cited supra note 9. Neither of these reasons is applicable to the facts of
the principal case.
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tedly contrary to fact would deprive the charity of a large share of the legacy con-
trary to an expressed congressional policy. Whether the instant decision will be a
precedent for more realistic treatment of the subject in future cases of a different
nature is difficult to ascertain. It is perhaps arguable that the decision allows the
proof of the extinction of the possibility of issue to be shown whenever
more than age alone conclusively determines the impossibility. Unfortunately for
such an argument the Court was careful to point out that neither the rule against
perpetuities, the devolution of property, nor the title to realty was here involved.11
It is, however, interesting to note that a week before the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in the instant case, a federal district court reached the same con-
clusion where the controlling consideration was age alone.12 But although in situa-
tions involving the rule against perpetuities the presumption has been seen to be
less objectionable and so firmly entrenched that the courts may hesitate to change it
without legislative authority, still in the other cases it would seem that where it is
certain either by reason of physical impairment or advanced age that the woman is
incapable of bearing issue, and conclusive proof of this fact is voluntarily put forth
so that no hardship would be imposed on the individual, the courts might be expected
to allow a rebuttal of the presumption if the interest of a living person is not thus
adversely affected.
STATUTORY PROTECTION OF PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS
UNDER the North Carolina Code' holders of one-fifth of the paid up stock of a
corporation may file a petition for dissolution of the corporation if "for three years
next preceeding the filing of the petition . . . the net earnings of the corporation
have not been sufficient to pay in good faith an annual dividend of 4% upon the
paid stock." That is to say, the court in considering such a petition need be con-
cerned only with the earnings of the corporation during the preceding three years,
regardless of whether or not dividends were in fact paid, or could have been paid
out of existing surplus. The plaintiff owned mainly preferred and some common
stock of the defendant corporation, and by aggregating the two types was able to
show the requisite one-fifth of the "paid-up stock." And although until recently
dividends had been fully paid on the preferred stock, the defendant corporation had
not earned enough to pay 4% on all of its stock for any of the past three years.
To the plaintiff's petition for dissolution, the defendant corporation demurred on
the ground that the statutes applied only to common stock, but the demurrer was
overruled by the trial court. In affirming this ruling, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that "stockholders" as used in the statute included non-voting preferred
shareholders as well as common.2 The court also indicated that if the low earnings
11. United States v. Provident Trust Co., supra note 7, at 392.
12. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 871 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
Age alone was held determinative of the extinction of the possibility in this case.
1. N. C. Coop ANNs. (Michie, 1931) § 1186. This section does not apply to charitable
corporations nor to banking or public-service corporations. It further provides that
petitions for dissolution may be filed by "stockholders" owning one-fifth of the stock
provided no dividends have been paid for six years preceding, or by owners of one-tenth
of the "common stock" provided no dividends have been paid on the "common stock"
for the preceding ten years.
2. Kistler v. Caldwell Cotton Mills Co., 172 S. E. 373 (N. C. 1934).
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were due to temporary business conditions and did not reasonably indicate impend-
ing insolvency, dissolution could be denied in the discretion of the trial judge.
The protection granted under this provision of the code is unusual. It has little
connection with the ordinary attempt to provide relief for minority stockholders
against fraud and mismanagement. For such evils, other sections give adequate
remedies to any stockholder, regardless of the proportion of his holdings.
3 Nor is
there any attempt in the present provision to compel the proper payment of divi-
dends. The sole object of the provision is to give certain groups the right to force
a liquidation of a financially unremunerative corporation. 4 There is nothing on the
face of the statute which indicates to what group of investors it is to be applicable.
The differences in the respective rights of common and non-voting preferred stock-
holders might, however, seem to furnish a reason for excluding the latter from a
right given to "stockholders" generally. By his investment the non-voting preferred
holder acquires certain rights against the corporation; but unlike the common holder
his earning power is limited and he has no control in the management. Consequently
the interests of the preferred holder differ from those of the common not only in
questions of dividend payment, but also in questions of the expansion of the business
and the continuance of the organization in the face of adverse conditions. 5 Under
the present interpretation of the provision a preferred holder could request a dis-
solution of the corporation even though it is to his interest alone, and even though
dividends had been paid regularly on his stock. A need for such a right is not at
once apparent, and it could be argued that such power should be restricted to the
common stock only.
3. Section 1185 of the N. C. Code provides, among other things, a remedy for minority
groups against the abuse of corporate powers by the majority. It is available to any
stockholder regardless of the amount of his holding. Lasley v. Walnut Cove Mercantile
Co., 179 N. C. 575, 103 S. E. 213 (1920). Section 1152 imposes personal liability upon
corporation officers, directors, and the controlling group for fraud and such action may be
maintained by a minority stockholder. Actions may be maintained by a stockholder for
fraud even though not within this section. White v. Kincaid, 149 N. C. 415, 63 S. E. 109
(1908); Braswell v. Pamlico Insurance & Banking Co., 159 N. C. 628, 75 S. E. 813 (1912).
4. Dissolution of a corporation at common law could be effected by the unanimous
consent of the stockholders and the surrender of the corporate franchise (3 Coox, CoRPoRA-
TIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 629) and acceptance of the surrender by the state (MARsALL,
CoPORATnoIs (1902) § 156). There is more doubt as to whether a majority could dissolve
the corporation, at least where it is a "going concern." Warren, Voluntary Transfers of
Corporate Undertakings (1917) 30 HAxv. L. Rzv. 335. In the absence of statute a
minority stockholder could not dissolve a corporation for mere failure to earn profits.
Dixie Lumber Co. et al. v. Helams, 202 Ala. 488, 80 So. 872 (1919).
5. Common owners are primarily concerned with earning large profits which, however,
are of no direct advantage to the preferred holder. He is limited to the specified dividend
rate as a bondholder is limited to his interest. A withholding of dividends to build up
a surplus for expansion and large profits is consequently not to his advantage. A larger
business increases the possibilities for greater dividends to the common but adds nothing to
the preferred holder's security and in fact endangers his return. This has happened in
many corporations, e.g. the expansion by way of building the Puget Sound extension in-
jured the preferred holders of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway. DEn(, A
STUDY or CORPORATION SECUaM s (1934) 184, n. 11. When adverse business conditions
are encountered the common holders are likely to risk more in doubtful circumstances
than the preferred due to their junior position with regard to the assets. Their policy
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Closer examination of the preferred owners' position, however, shows real need
for protection in just such circumstances. Ordinarily the protection of the interests
of the preferred holders is confined to the terms of the express contract creating the
relation between them and the corporation.
6 Thus, the right to dividends is pro-
tected by the usual provision that preferred dividends shall be paid before any
dividend'is paid to the common; and for further security the preference is com-
monly made cumulative. 7 Consequently the common can not, by passing dividends
in one period, make available for distribution to themselves larger sums in the future.
But protection against loss of the capital investment is equally, if not more, im-
portant.8 Thus the contract may stipulate that no bonds shall be issued or liabilities
incurred for expansion without the preferred holders' consent.
9 Such a provision is
included because preferred holders, being limited in the amount of their dividends,
have nothing to gain from expansion of a successful business, and might lose if
the expansion turned out to be unwise.' 0 Also, it is generally provided that upon
dissolution the preferred holders shall, to the extent of unpaid dividends and the
stated value of their stock, share in the assets before any payments are made to
common holders. So long as the corporation is successful, and its obligations are
met according to expectation, these protections are adequate. But they are not so
when the business is unsuccessful. After a period of unprofitable operation during
which no dividends are paid, large obligations may have been incurred by borrowing,
so that if liquidation is undertaken, or if the corporation is reorganized, no equity
will remain for the preferred holders." Thus the management may be in a position
to force sacrifices upon the holders of preferred by threatening to bring about one
of these events, and thereby inducing preferred holders to exchange their securities
for others, waiving their cumulated dividend rights.' 2 Or, if it is impossible thus to
preserve the corporation, actual liquidation or reorganization may take place, in
which case the preferred may lose most or all of their interest. To protect the pre-
ferred owners against these possibilities it may be stipulated that complete or partial
control shall vest in them if there is a lapse of dividends for a specified period.
This added protection however, has been found to be illusory.13 The common
would be to continue since actually they risk only the loss of the possibility of future
earnings whereas the preferred risk not only that but also the real possibility of losing
their equity.
6. SEARs, TnE NEW PLAcE OF THE STocxHoLVRm (1929) 91.
7. Every issue of preferred stock offered to the public since 1923 has had this provision
included in its contract. DEwixG, op. cit. supra note 5, at 171.
8. "The most vitally important protection is that which safeguards them [the pre-
ferred holders] against the dissipation of the assets of the business." DEwiNG, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 184. Cf. BER N MEms, Tim MODEM CORORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1932) 281.
9. As to the frequency of this provision see DEWING, op. cit. supra note 5, at 190.
10. Supra note 5.
11. The chief weakness in preferred stock from a financial angle lies in the fact that
it can not prevent the incurrence of heavy indebtedness secured by prior liens. The great-
est danger is in regard to bank loans, and similar types of borrowing, which can be
effected secretly.
12. DEWING, op. cit. supra note 5, at 172, n. aa.
13. Some preferred contracts have the protective device of allowing the preferred
owners to elect a specified number of directors. This is actually of little value since
ordinarily the controlling group has the authority to increase the number of directors.
holders are anxious to retain control, and to do so may pay dividends to the pre-
ferred group long after sound financial policy would advise discontinuance. The
net result is to encourage a dissipation of assets and increased borrowing during
adverse conditions with the result that when control finally changes hands it may
be too late to do any good.
1 4
By the present decision to bring preferred as well as common holders within the
terms of the statute, the court has extended to them a protection that is well de-
signed to safeguard their interests. Thus it is possible for a preferred stockholder
to request dissolution of a corporation even though all its contractual obligations
have been fully met, but it has earned such a small profit as to be deemed unsuc-
cessful and perhaps headed for insolvency. There is no need to wait until the
company is insolvent, or until it has actually failed to pay dividends. Consequently
it may be possible to secure favorable court action before a final period of misfor-
tune overtakes the corporation and makes other remedies valueless. This protection
is so great that few corporations would be willing voluntarily to accord it to pre-
ferred holders unless at the time of the organization of the corporation, the preferred
interests are important to its organization and are well aware of the need for such
protection. To the average investor in such stocks the mere fact of dividend prefer-
ence and contingent voting rights seem to be ample for protection.YL Since it is
not thus effective in fact, the weakness of their position has encouraged creation
of corporate structures wherein financial interest and control are widely separated,
a practice that has been much criticized. 16 The present application of the statute to
all stockholders is useful to discourage such practice by giving a needed degree of
control to this type of investor.17
14. DxviGo, op. cit. supra note 5, at 185, n. mm.
15. For an analysis of the security holder of today see BEaR.E Aw MEAS, op. cit. supra
note 8, Bk. I, c. 4.
16. For the severest and most effective criticism see RiPLEY, AUN S Er AND WALL
STREET (1927) and for an earlier one see Ripley, More Power to the Bankers (Dec. 2,
1925) 121 TuE NATION 618. See also, VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWIzsmp (1923).
17. In the formation of a new corporation the promoters, as a part of the process of
separating ownership and control, frequently overvaluate the common stock retained by
them for management purposes, thus giving an illusive appearance of additional security
to the preferred stockholders' capital investment. If the corporation produces high earnings
a large increment of value accrues to the controlling common stockholders without
any corresponding benefits to the preferred; but if the business is not financially suc-
cessful, control may still remain in the common stockholders. The present provision,
however, gives the preferred stockholder some protection, since, even though the com-
pany pays preferred dividends for three years, it is possible that the total aggregated
earnings will not equal 4% on the stated value of the stock which, under the statute,
would include the "water." In this event, the preferred holder would be in a strategic
position to secure control and real protection.
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